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Summary 
The act of “cooperating” involves doing something together to achieve a mutually agreed 
goal. For more than half a century, actors involved in international development 
cooperation have witnessed the difficulty of putting into practice something so seemingly 
straightforward. In the period from 2003 to 2011, a series of High-Level Fora in Rome, 
Paris, Accra and Busan added to an evolving aid- and development-effectiveness agenda. A 
central conviction of this agenda is that development partnerships only succeed when they 
are led by developing-country stakeholders. Managing cooperation with a multitude of 
external partners, however, requires strong capacity on the side of developing countries. In 
addition to acknowledging the centrality of ownership, the agenda also emphasised the need 
to support developing countries in further developing their capacity to do so.  
Capacity development is defined as the process whereby people, organisations and society 
as a whole strengthen their ability to manage affairs successfully. There is wide consensus 
that capacity development (CD) is a key task for development cooperation, as well as one of 
the most challenging. This paper analyses to what extent the aid- and development-
effectiveness agenda has been applied in the area of capacity development support (CDS), 
with a specific focus on the use of developing-country systems. The paper is based on a 
literature review and a limited number of semi-structured interviews, as well as a review of 
available research evidence on CDS practices in Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda and Vietnam.  
The aid- and development-effectiveness agenda: outdated and unfinished at the same time? 
Although the aid- and development-effectiveness agenda has promoted significant 
improvements during the past and present decade, most commitments remain unfulfilled. 
The most recent meeting in Busan reaffirmed earlier commitments, yet also revamped the 
Global Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation by including additional 
cooperation actors, including those countries that are both recipients and providers of 
development cooperation. It was further agreed to “decentralise” the implementation of the 
agenda by adapting the commitments to the reality in specific countries and regions. Two 
years onwards, a more elusive international dialogue structure – informed through a loose 
“coalitions of the willing” with a low engagement by South-South Cooperation providers – 
adds to a lack of clarity concerning the contents of the agenda, which some now consider as 
having been overtaken by events. As international cooperation is likely to become more, 
rather than less, knowledge-intensive over time, capacity development will nonetheless 
remain a key objective.  
International capacity development support: elusive both in theory and practice 
International development policy emphasises the nature of capacity development as an 
endogenous, relational and long-term change process, thus acknowledging that there is only 
a limited role for external development partners. In the years that followed, efforts have 
been made to further operationalise this broad concept, clarifying that capacity consists of 
both soft- and hardware, and that it is dynamic and relational as opposed to static and 
independent. There is ample evidence of countries that successfully strengthened capacity 
as a basis for sustainable development. 
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Although many development partners formally subscribe to the understanding of capacity 
development as an endogenous process, their practice too often reflects a definition of 
“capacity” as a country’s ability to successfully implement its development interventions. 
There is an uneasy match between the “interventionist” nature of development cooperation 
and the understanding of capacity development as an endogenous change process that easily 
outlives a development project’s life cycle. Approaches to facilitating capacity development 
range from direct to hands-off or distant learning approaches, yet stakeholders are often 
more interested in “getting things done” than in genuine capacity development.  
Development interventions can be divided into two groups: one that supports capacity 
development as a primary objective and another that promotes it as a means to achieve 
other development results. Most support of the former category is provided in a multitude 
of forms under the generic label of “technical cooperation” (TC). The effectiveness of CDS 
is hard to measure: (a) it is not clear whether all support reported as TC seeks to contribute 
to capacity development, and if so to what extent; (b) when capacity development is the 
purpose, baselines are often missing, objectives defined for the support are frequently hard 
to measure and, even when they are clear, the monitoring is incomplete; and (c) 
independent evaluation investments in CDS are relatively low compared to other types of 
development interventions, and often not available in the public domain. 
Developing countries often experience difficulties in sufficiently benefiting from external 
inputs to their capacity development processes. Structural problems in the public service are 
important for highlighting the lack of effective ownership in many developing countries, 
but an equally important cause is the dominant approach, in which external support is 
designed, delivered and evaluated. Developing-country demand is frequently distorted by 
oversupply, absent information on the value of the assistance offered as well as on possible 
alternatives, tying of support and integration into larger support packages. Many 
development partners are path-dependent in providing certain forms of TC that may not 
always be appropriate for effective support.  
Slow progress in managing capacity development support through developing country systems 
The question of what is meant with the term “country systems” is not straightforward. The 
Paris Declaration presents multiple definitions, whereas its monitoring framework narrows 
the concept to public finance management (PFM). The Declaration simultaneously considers 
the strengthening of country systems as a condition for effective development cooperation 
and as a legitimate development result by itself. When it comes to CDS, interventions differ 
in the extent to which (1) they support capacity development of country systems, and (2) the 
extent to which their planning, implementation and evaluation make use of country systems.  
Although there are important differences between development partners, practice generally 
falls far short of the commitments made in Paris, Accra and Busan. Many development 
partners remain reluctant and retain considerable discretion in determining when country 
systems are ready. Different approaches to measuring country systems are used – they are 
normative in the sense of having different priorities and understandings of country systems. 
Studies identify strong disincentives to using country systems – on both the side of the 
provider and the recipient of development cooperation – that relate to issues including trust, 
risk, benefits, visibility and control. In the area of CDS, the need for this support to be 
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provided through country systems has been repeatedly expressed but not translated into 
action. Studies conclude that fundamental changes in the planning and design phase are 
needed to strengthen effectiveness. Further potential is found in financial transparency, 
developing country-led recruitment processes, and improvement of monitoring and 
evaluability.  
Evidence on management of capacity development in four developing countries 
To complement the analysis of general policy discussions and practices, an exploration was 
made of policies and practices in managing CDS in four developing countries. 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Nepal and Vietnam were selected based on (1) available research 
evidence and (2) applicability of research findings to similar countries. The countries 
perform above-average in aid- and development-effectiveness targets, although different 
assessment models come to different assessments of their country systems. Document 
analysis assessing general management approaches were combined with an analysis of the 
health sector. The following table presents an overview.  
Overall development cooperation management-approaches range from strong centralised 
control efforts (Rwanda) to accommodating policies seeking to maximise access to official 
development assistance (ODA) (Mozambique). Some have adopted policies that include 
overall objectives for CDS and set out effectiveness principles (Nepal), whereas others have 
also prioritised specific areas for support (Rwanda, Vietnam). In contrast to this, 
Mozambique has not set out any overall policy principles for CDS and lacks a formal 
strategy. In contrast to these different approaches, the research evidence indicates that 
development partners’ CDS practices are hard to manage in all four countries. It remains a 
challenge to improve transparency of TC and to channel these investments through country 
systems (Rwanda, Nepal), while in Vietnam the management approach used reorients core 
ministry capacity from policy-making towards aid management. The evidence further 
shows that the four countries experience equal difficulty in taking control of CDS offered 
by their South-South cooperation partners.  
This overall picture of policies and practices in managing CDS provides some interesting 
contrasts with the specific situation in the health sector. The health ministry in Mozambique 
has taken early steps to promote harmonisation, including through a TC pooling 
arrangement. However, the situation has worsened in recent years due to many development 
partners preferring bilateral and heavily earmarked support arrangements. Nepal and 
Vietnam, two different countries, face similar challenges, as support bypasses and 
negatively affects health-system capacity. In Rwanda, 60 per cent of the health sector 
budget is funded through development cooperation, which has led to impressive results but 
also to an overconcentration on some diseases and system inconsistencies. Similar to Nepal, 
much TC does not go through government systems but through alternative “channels”. 
Conclusions and recommendations for further research 
Three main conclusions are drawn from this paper. First of all, available research confirms 
that aid- and development-effectiveness achievements in the area of capacity development 
have been slow and disappointing, owing to reform-resistance of key stakeholders involved. 
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Second, considerable potential remains to strengthen the effectiveness of CDS by further 
adapting approaches to design, deliver and evaluate interventions in reference to key aid- 
and development-effectiveness principles. Third, a lack of disaggregation of statistics and 
low levels of investment in evaluation inhibits learning and accountability, and ultimately 
the improvement of capacity development results.  
Based on the analysis presented here, four windows of opportunity are identified as means 
to improve the effectiveness of external support. First, development partners should 
decentralise the programming of CDS to their embassies and country representations. 
Second, active efforts should be made to demystify the support by identifying concrete 
objectives, improving evaluations and making these publicly available. Third, 
implementation of the first two recommendations would allow for further disaggregating 
the OECD/DAC reporting on technical cooperation and allow for separating genuine CDS 
from projects with other relevant purposes. Fourth, the desk research conducted on 
developing country management of support confirms that further empirical research in this 
area can further inform the concretisation and implementation of these recommendations 
and play a role in improving the effectiveness of support. 
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1 Introduction: the challenge of supporting capacity development 
International development policy discussions recognise that development partnerships 
only succeed when they are led by developing-country stakeholders. Translating this 
conviction into effective cooperation requires tailoring external inputs to country-specific 
contexts, systems and needs. Moreover, international partners need to respect developing-
country leadership and resist the temptation to attempt driving the development process by 
themselves. At the fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in December 
2011, international partners thus committed to promote effective institutions by using 
“country systems as the default approach for development cooperation in support of 
activities managed by the public sector, working with and respecting the governance 
structures of both the provider of development cooperation and the developing country” 
(Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 2011, 5).  
The statement adopted in Busan builds on earlier international policy discussions on how 
to promote effective development cooperation. These discussions emphasise that 
development cooperation should be provided to and through “country systems”, which 
have been defined as covering a country’s processes for planning, budgeting, PFM, 
accountability and learning. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness expressed 
two key assumptions about the use of country systems: (1) when development cooperation 
is managed through country systems, this helps to strengthen these systems; (2) external 
support can help to strengthen the capacity of these systems.  
For several decades international development partners1 have made considerable 
investments in supporting capacity development in developing countries. Capacity 
development is defined as “the process whereby people, organisations and society as a 
whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time” (OECD 2006, 
12). The endogenous nature of capacity development implies that there is only a limited 
role for external development partners, who can support but not drive change. Substantial 
external support to capacity development is provided by bilateral and multilateral 
development partners through ODA. These inputs are most often provided through 
dedicated projects under the heading of “Technical Cooperation”.  
Developing countries often experience difficulties in sufficiently taking charge of – and 
appropriating external inputs to – their capacity development processes. In addition to 
structural problems and capacity deficits in many developing-country governments, this is 
also due to the dominant ways in which the external support is designed, delivered and 
evaluated. CDS is frequently distorted and ineffective due to oversupply, lack of 
transparent information on the value of – and alternatives to – the assistance offered, or by 
other development assistance being conditional on accepting capacity development 
interventions (ActionAid International 2011; World Bank 2001; Land / Morgan 2008; 
OPM 2003; Whitfield 2009b; DFID 2013).  
                                                            
1 Earlier fora in Paris and Accra used the terms “donor” and “recipient” in relation to the management of 
“aid”. In Busan the term “aid” was kept but linked to “developing countries” and “providers of 
development co-operation”. Few are comfortable with the old terms “donor”, “aid” and “recipient”, yet 
alternatives such as “development partner” and “partner country” are deemed confusing (Wood et al. 
2011). This paper uses the terms “development partner” and “developing country” and minimises use 
of the term “aid”, which captures the current post-Busan situation of a system trying to simultaneously 
consolidate and innovate.  
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Only modest progress has been made in applying aid- and development-effectiveness 
principles in the area of CDS. Given that international aid-effectiveness policy statements 
are non-binding, progress depends on a shared conviction among actors of the necessity to 
translate what has been agreed into practice. Although having been praised for “enlarging 
the tent” of stakeholders in development cooperation, Busan has also stirred confusion as 
to which stakeholders have committed to what, and to what extent the new commitments 
add to or replace the existing aid- and development-effectiveness agenda (Eyben / Savage 
2012). The drop in international momentum, however, does not keep developing countries 
from taking own initiatives to optimally benefit from external support.  
This paper connects general debates on aid and development effectiveness and the use of 
country systems in development cooperation to the debate on how to provide effective 
external support to endogenous capacity development in developing countries. The paper 
has two aims. First, it seeks to inform international research and policy debates on 
international aid and development effectiveness, with a specific focus on how to 
strengthen the effectiveness of support to capacity development. Secondly, the paper seeks 
to identify key elements for future empirical research in the area of capacity development. 
The analysis presented is primarily based on a document review of policy discussions, 
research reports and academic literature on the topics concerned, while semi-structured 
interviews have been conducted to complement the analysis of policy debates and gather 
additional information.2  
Although there is adequate research evidence on the use of country systems in 
development cooperation, including the monitoring surveys and external evaluations of 
the Paris Declaration, there is an important research gap on the use of country systems for 
interventions to support capacity development. The bulk of research on capacity 
development is moreover commissioned by development agencies, whereas academic 
research on this topic is scarce. The desk research carried out for this paper covers four 
types of documents: (1) general and specific policy documents, (2) statistics gathered by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other 
institutions, (3) academic research on aid and development effectiveness and capacity 
development, and (4) independent research commissioned by development partners and 
implementing agencies. In addition, the research also looked into available statistics on 
CDS and consulted development agency publications that describe specific projects to get 
an overview of the different approaches to support that are being used today (e.g. 
Woodhatch et al. 2011).  
The paper consists of two parts. Part one reviews international aid- and development-
effectiveness discussions, the definition and operationalisation of capacity development, 
and the development of aid effectiveness of external support to capacity development. 
Section 2 discusses key evolutions on the international aid- and development-effectiveness 
agenda and contextualises the paper’s research topic in relation to recent evolutions of the 
international debate following Busan. Section 3 presents an overview of how the concepts 
of capacity development have evolved and discusses what instruments are used to support 
capacity development. Section 4 subsequently discusses to what extent instruments can 
                                                            
2  A total of 15 people were interviewed, of which 4 work at the BMZ, 4 at the GIZ, 3 at the KfW, 2 at 
the EC, and 2 at Eurodad.  
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make use of developing-country systems, and discusses the (dis)incentives for developing 
countries and their development partners to use these systems.  
The paper’s second part looks into practices in designing, implementing and evaluating 
specific CDS approaches in four countries (Section 5). These countries each represent 
different categories of partnership between a developing-country government and its 
international partners, namely a donor-push partnership (Mozambique), an emergent 
partnership (Nepal), a recipient-pull partnership (Rwanda) and a mature partnership 
(Vietnam) (Beaulieu / LeBlanc 2006). The analysis looks into general patterns of CDS and 
governments’ policies and practices for managing this support, complemented with an 
assessment of specific policies and practices in the health sector. This allows for a general 
appreciation of the extent to which the developing countries concerned and their 
international development partners are willing and able to plan, design and evaluate 
effective support to capacity development. Section 6 presents this paper’s main conclusions 
and recommendations. 
2 Background: international policy debates on aid and development  
effectiveness 
2.1 From Paris to Busan: ownership as leitmotiv 
Efforts seeking to improve the individual and collective effectiveness of public and private 
resources invested to promote development go back several decades, but the signing of the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in February 2005 packaged these efforts into an 
“aid effectiveness agenda”. This agenda has been described as “the best summary we have 
on the lessons of a half-century of experience in trying to achieve good results and avoid 
doing harm with aid” (Booth 2008, 1).  
The aid-effectiveness agenda is to an important extent evidence-based as well as led by 
normative convictions that development partners and developing countries claim to 
collectively share (Knack 2012, 3). Its central assumption is that external inputs can be 
effectively managed to contribute positively to a development process led by developing-
country stakeholders. The Paris Declaration followed a trend set by the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) to accompany a non-binding political declaration with a 
monitoring framework that identifies key targets and indicators. By committing to 
ongoing reporting in relation to such a monitoring framework, the Paris Declaration as 
well as follow-up Declarations adopted at subsequent High-Level Fora in Accra (2008) 
and Busan (2011) seek to function as codes of conduct and sources of peer pressure to 
facilitate the changes committed to by its signatories.  
The aid-effectiveness agenda has been visually represented as a pyramid consisting of five 
core principles.3 The capstone of this pyramid is the principle of ownership, which the 
Paris Declaration defines as being fulfilled when “[d]eveloping countries exercise effective 
leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development 
actions” (PD 2005, 3). Almost a decade earlier, the term “local ownership” was made the 
core element of the Comprehensive Development Framework of the World Bank and the 
                                                            
3  Ownership, alignment, harmonisation, management for development results and mutual accountability. 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1999. This framework defined the basis for 
ownership as “a long term vision (…) that balances good macroeconomic and financial 
management with sound social, structural and human policies” (Wolfensohn / Fischer 
2000, 1). This vision was to be prepared by a developing country in the form of a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The PRSPs subsequently informed the Paris 
Declaration’s choice to operationalise the concept of ownership by developing countries 
having adopted “operational development strategies”. The related indicator of progress for 
ownership looked into the number of countries having such plans that are linked to a 
medium-term expenditure framework and reflected in annual budgets (PD 2005). 
The Declaration’s ownership indicator has contributed to a misinterpretation of the 
concept as a static precondition for effective development cooperation, whereas in practice 
ownership is an objective that can only be fostered over time through a dynamic process 
(Leutner / Müller 2010, 52). Although international declarations on aid and development 
effectiveness may give a different impression, development cooperation is essentially a 
negotiated relationship. The design, implementation and review of development 
cooperation is an outcome of this negotiation process. From this understanding, Leutner 
and Müller (2010, 53) argue that “[o]wnership is expressed by the ability and possibility of 
both sides to say ‘no’ to offers as well as to demands.”  
Several studies support the belief that having a PRSP is an inappropriate indication of 
whether developing countries effectively manage their development process (Dijkstra 
2011; Booth 2011; Renard 2006). The existence of an operational national poverty 
reduction strategy is by no means an indication that a developing-country’s government 
exercises effective leadership over the development process. The drafting of such national 
development plans often depends heavily on external inputs and have been adopted 
primarily by many countries as a means to gain access to ODA and debt relief. In most 
countries the plans thus did not provide a strong steer to the national development process 
(Booth 2011).  
Other studies observe that development partners distort ownership with the approaches 
they use and the conditions they set. Under such conditions “capability traps” can develop, 
a dynamic in which governments constantly adopt reforms to ensure the continuation of 
ODA flows without promoting any real improvements, which strongly undermines 
effective ownership (Andrews / Pritchett / Woolcock 2012; De Weijer 2013). Importing 
institutional solutions through external partners is not intrinsically undesirable, but 
becomes harmful to development once the process of design and implementation is 
primarily driven by external partners (Krause 2013). A comparative study of aid 
management in eight African countries concludes that this threat is real, as in most of 
these countries the proliferation of development partners and high ODA budgets has 
diffused government control over its development programme. Most of the studied 
governments resorted to accepting this situation by pursuing accommodating strategies 
with the aim of maximising access to external funding, at the expense of strong control 
over – and ownership of – the development process (Whitfield 2009a; Whitfield 2009b). 
Paragraph 13 of the Paris Declaration recognises that “commitments need to be 
interpreted in the light of the specific situation of each developing country”, which would 
allow for the formulation of more meaningful and contextualised definitions of ownership 
and related principles to guide further action (PD 2005, 3). This generally failed to happen 
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due to the tension with the Declaration’s monitoring framework, which presents a 
universal and – given the absence of a baseline at the time of adoption – arbitrary 
monitoring framework. There is a trade-off between local adaptation and the Declaration’s 
code of conduct function to confirm performance or expose non-performance of both 
developing countries and their development partners. The independent evaluation of the 
Paris Declaration concluded that the 12 indicators were insufficiently representative, and 
in some cases insufficiently reliable, and to a large extent narrowed the scope of the 
agenda to the content of its monitoring framework (Wood et al. 2011).  
The rigid monitoring framework as well as the differing “aid-effectiveness baselines” and 
challenges in developing countries meant that prescribed aid-effectiveness actions were 
often overdone or inappropriate. Prevailing top-down implementation approaches led to 
the agenda going out of control in “congested” developing countries such as Mozambique, 
or becoming delegitimised in countries where development processes were too dynamic to 
be guided by rationalist planning and state intervention (Odén / Wohlgemuth 2011; 
Steinich 2010). A limited number of developing countries nonetheless managed to provide 
a strong management push for local adaptation, and in that way successfully managed 
their development partners (Whitfield 2009b).  
Although signatories of the agenda generated important international momentum, 
translating this into practice in the form of effective cooperation has been challenging, and 
in many cases has remained far below the expectations generated. As important context 
information for this paper, the next section reviews progress made in policy discussions on 
aid and development effectiveness since Busan. 
2.2 Life after Busan? 
Following Paris, the subsequent High-Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness in Accra (2008) 
and Busan (2011) were much more ambitious in scope and inclusive in process, yet they 
did not fundamentally change the essence of the Paris Declaration. The Accra Agenda 
for Action (AAA) did add several time-bound and specific commitments in areas such as 
aid untying and transparency, as well as a more detailed and process-oriented definition 
of ownership. However, the low level of performance by the signatories to implement 
these new commitments reduced its credibility.  
Compared to the AAA, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 
contained fewer concrete and time-bound decisions, and is considered to have more 
symbolical than operational value due to the non-committal commitment by emerging 
economies (Keijzer / Moe Fejerskov 2013).4 The Busan outcome document also sought 
to “manage expectations” of development cooperation by stressing the influence of other 
policy areas beyond development cooperation as well as the central role of the 
developing countries’ own resources for development. Although the outcome document 
speaks of “building” on the commitments made in Paris and Accra, there was a sense 
throughout the preparation of the event that key signatories considered the Paris 
                                                            
4  International policy statements on development cooperation are by definition voluntary, but emerging 
countries nonetheless insisted on additional language on the first page of the Busan document stating 
that this voluntary nature applied even more to them. See Atwood (2012) for a detailed description. 
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Declaration as “well past its sell-by date” (Eyben / Savage 2012, 3). The imagined 
geographies of “North” and “South” and discursive struggles on their approaches to 
cooperation add to a situation in which there is a lack of clarity on the contents of the aid 
and development effectiveness, and where some now consider this agenda as having 
been overtaken by events (Eyben / Savage 2012, 3). 
The Busan outcome document abandoned the Paris Declaration’s monitoring framework 
and called for a “global light and country heavy” approach to promoting aid and 
development effectiveness. This expression indicates a desired trend to tilt the balance 
of the agenda from standardisation (and the peer pressure it generates) towards more 
differentiation. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (International Dialogue 
on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2011) should be seen as one such approach to a 
more context-sensitive and “differentiated” agenda. As expressed in paragraph 35(a) of 
Busan, a stronger focus on adapting the agenda to country-specific aid and development 
effectiveness also allows for reducing the international aid-effectiveness “bureaucracy”, 
which was judged as having become too heavy and top-down. This resulted in the 
phasing out of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness and the creation of the Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation (GP) in June 2012.  
A combination of a rather closed GP Steering Committee that lacks transparency 
compared to the OECD DAC structures, slow progress in formulating a global 
monitoring framework as well as taking further the “country heavy” bit of the agreement 
has hampered concrete achievements by the new constellation.5 Whereas during the 
preparation for Accra people spoke of “aid-effectiveness fatigue”, these days one could 
rather speak of “aid-effectiveness indifference”. At this moment discussions continue in 
several “building blocks” and platforms that promote discussion on key priorities agreed 
in Busan,6 in preparation for GP Steering Committee meetings and a Ministerial GP 
meeting planned for the first half of 2014. It is, however, unclear to what extent and how 
these building blocks and platforms report to, or otherwise feed into, the GP meetings. 
Their uneven membership moreover reflects varying levels of commitment by some 
development partners and developing countries to earlier agreements made in Paris and 
Accra. Few South-South cooperation providers engage actively, while China and India 
openly criticise the new set-up as “too Northern” and have yet to engage.7 
Despite the drop in international momentum, the importance of ownership for effective 
cooperation remains uncontested. The commitment to strengthen effective institutions 
features centrally in the Busan outcome document and was also recognised in the recent 
report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda as both a means and an end of future global development efforts 
(HLP 2013). Support to strengthening institutions through development cooperation is 
often linked to “capacity development support”. The next section analyses how the 
                                                            
5  For more information see: http://www.effectivecooperation.org/ (accessed 24 Apr. 2013).  
6  See: http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/ 
fourthhighlevelforumonaideffectivenessbuildingblocksponsors.htm (accessed 22 May 2013). 
7  For an example, see this speech delivered by India’s Foreign Secretary in April 2014: http://mea. 
gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/21549 (accessed 24 Apr. 2013). 
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concept of capacity development has evolved over time and how it features in 
development policy and practice.  
3 Understanding and supporting capacity development 
3.1 What is capacity and how does it develop? 
The concept of capacity development came into vogue during the 1980s (Lavergne / 
Saxby 1999) and gradually replaced and subsumed other concepts used to describe 
approaches to support change processes in developing countries, including “institution-
building”, “human resource development” and “new institutionalism”. Definition-wise, 
the different concepts were all related, yet each reflected elements of the dominant 
development narrative at the time (Kühl 2009). 
The importance attached to capacity development in the Paris Declaration further elevated 
its presence in international policy debates. The Declaration emphasises the nature of 
capacity development as an endogenous, relational and long-term change process. This 
international consensus is captured by the following definitions adopted by the 
Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD 2006): 
• Capacity is the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their 
affairs successfully. 
• Capacity development8 is the process whereby people, organisations and society as a 
whole unlock, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time. 
• Support to capacity development refers to what outside partners – domestic or 
foreign – can do to support, facilitate or catalyse capacity development and related 
change processes. 
These definitions emphasise that capacity develops endogenously and that there are limits 
to what outside partners can do to support this development, or, as argued more bluntly by 
Bossuyt (1994, 1): “development does not take place by throwing money, projects and 
expatriates at problems.” The endogenous nature of capacity development is further 
strengthened by the focus on “managing affairs successfully”, a deliberate wording that 
leaves it to the “subject” to judge whether it sees its capacity developing. Woodhill (2010, 
49) argues that while this makes sense at the individual level, at organisational and 
institutional levels “capacity development becomes rather meaningless in the absence of 
attention to the objectives of collective efforts.” Others have criticised the DAC’s 
definition for depoliticising capacity development by making it appear as value-free 
solutions to technical problems, and emphasise that capacity development creates winners 
and losers and is inherently political (Ortiz 2013).  
                                                            
8  Initially the term “capacity building” was used, but was soon accompanied by “capacity development”, 
which some consider to emphasise the endogenous nature of capacity and its development. The two 
terms are, however, considered similar, if not identical, and both are still in use today. 
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Capacity is not an absolute or static state but instead is both relative and dynamic. 
Moreover, capacity is relational and strongly linked to legitimacy, “a generalised 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper and 
appropriate within some socially constructed systems of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions” (Baser / Morgan 2008, 4). Three strategies are used to maintain or increase 
legitimacy: (1) conforming to socially accepted forms and practices; (2) informing by 
communicating with constituents using terminology associated with socially legitimate 
practice; and (3) manipulating to influence constituents’ perceptions using a variety of 
tools (Brinkerhoff 2005).  
The broad nature of the concept as addressing a multi-level and multi-stakeholder 
development process explains its strong appeal to policy-makers (OECD 2010b; UNDG 
2008). Although such a broad concept would seem useful for overall guidance, Hradsky et 
al. (2010, 2) argue that there is a need to further concretise and specify the concept when it 
is used, otherwise “discussions on capacity development tend to become general 
exchanges on what makes for good development practice.” It can indeed be argued that 
capacity development has become so overloaded with meaning that it increasingly 
becomes a synonym for development assistance (Kühl 2009, 560). 
As a possible means to go beyond the general DAC definitions, development partners 
made efforts to further operationalise the concept of capacity by commissioning studies 
that distinguish different “dimensions” or “sub-sets” of capacity. Table 1 presents some 
examples: 
Table 1: Comparison of approaches to operationalise capacity 
UNDP (2009) 
functional capacities 
NEPAD (2011) 
cornerstones 
WBI (2012) 
Intermediate capacity 
outcomes 
ECDPM (2011) 
core capabilities 
Engaging stakeholders Leadership 
transformation 
Raised awareness 
 
Capability to commit 
and act 
Assessing a situation Citizen transformation Enhanced knowledge or 
skills 
 
Capability to relate 
Formulating policies 
and strategies 
Knowledge and 
innovation 
Improved consensus and 
teamwork 
Capability to achieve 
coherence 
Budgeting, managing 
and implementing 
Using African potential, 
skills and resources 
Strengthened coalitions 
 
Capability to deliver 
development results 
Evaluating Capacity of capacity-
builders 
Enhanced networks 
 
Capability to adapt 
and self-renew 
 Integrated planning and 
implementation 
New implementation 
know-how 
 
Source: Own compilation (Baser 2011; DRN 2012) 
These typologies show a number of overlaps, while at the same time showing differences 
in emphasis. These imply different priorities for CDS, as well as in some cases differences 
between the interests and the priorities of the agencies that developed the typologies. All 
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present a combination of more visible and invisible aspects, that is, an understanding that 
capacity development requires both soft- and hardware investments. Some approaches use 
these component parts of capacity to identify capacity baselines and targets as a basis for 
formulating indicators that can be used to measure progress (e.g. DRN 2012; WBICR 
2012; Keijzer et al. 2011). A recent study identified a wide range of approaches that can 
be used for planning, monitoring and evaluating capacity development, and which ones 
differ in the extent to which they follow linear approaches to planning, give emphasis to 
specific aspects of capacity, or specifically focus on the process of supporting capacity 
development. Some of these approaches are well established and have been in use for a 
number of years, but many have yet to be integrated into dominant approaches to 
planning, monitoring and evaluation (Baser 2011). Available approaches also differ in the 
emphasis they give to standardisation and comparability vis-à-vis “transposing” standard 
indicators to specific contexts and realities.  
Despite the critique of its vagueness, available research evidence confirms the key 
importance of endogenous capacity change for sustainable development. The 2013 Human 
Development Report (HDR) observed that between 1990 and 2012, a total of 40 countries 
in the South realised greater human development increases than would have been 
predicted from their past performance. These gains were due to the countries’ strong 
ownership of change in three areas: (1) a proactive developmental state, (2) tapping of 
global markets, and (3) determined social policy innovation (UNDP 2013). The report 
further finds that few countries would have sustained rapid growth without having made 
impressive levels of public investment in health and education. The countries thus 
progressed by taking charge of and driving their own development process and strongly 
benefited from an approach of “importing what the rest of the world knows and exporting 
what it wants” (UNDP 2013, 4–5).  
The analysis of the HDR describes how the “rise of the South” was enabled by countries 
successfully managing an endogenous process of increasing available capacities, in which 
development cooperation often played a stimulating, yet far from decisive role. The 
technological capabilities approach to economic development confirms this by 
emphasising that accessing technology does not automatically result in efficient use, and 
that productive capabilities cannot simply be transferred (Whitfield 2011). Doing so 
instead takes effort and investments, and “requires learning-by-doing where tacit 
knowledge is acquired” (Whitfield 2011, 13). This was well illustrated by South Korea, 
the host of the fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, and a country that, within 
less than half a century, managed to rebuild its nation after a devastating war and develop 
into a high-income country and member of the OECD. Although development cooperation 
has been important, the country’s capacity mainly developed through the strong and 
concerted efforts of the state and its citizens, who both prioritised education over anything 
else (Myung-bak 2011). 
Having looked at the origin and definition of the concept of capacity, as well as the 
successes of many countries in the world in strengthening it, the next section looks into 
how this concept evolved in the area of international development policy.  
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3.2 Capacity development support through development cooperation 
Most overall development policy strategies over the past two decades have used the term 
“capacity” in a rather loose and instrumental manner. Whereas many development 
partners formally subscribe to the DAC definition of capacity, dominant development 
cooperation practices all too often imply a definition of “capacity” as a country’s ability to 
successfully cooperate with or implement development interventions. As a result, the term 
gets used a lot when development cooperation does not achieve the intended results, as 
this is then linked to a “lack of capacity” on the side of the developing country.  
Critical members of parliament, media coverage and influential publications have created 
strong “value for money” pressures in OECD countries, which have led to unrealistic 
expectations and political pressures in relation to development. In the area of capacity 
development, these pressures frequently lead to overambitious interventions that involve 
capacity substitution instead of support to endogenous capacity development processes 
(Keijzer 2013). However, this cannot be purely attributed to the development partners, as, 
in practice, all stakeholders involved may be more interested in “getting things done” than 
in support that mainly involves hands-off advice (Morgan 2008b, 13). Morton (2013) 
refers in this regard to a general need for each development programme to find a balance 
between service delivery and facilitating long-term development.  
These research findings support an inquiry into what is actually being done when 
development interventions are represented as contributions to capacity development. As a 
means to help distinguish between such approaches, a joint evaluation produced a helpful 
continuum, which is summarised in Table 2. A more explicit consideration of appropriate 
role(s) may help to avoid capacity substitution in contexts where this may do more harm 
than good.  
Table 2: A continuum of approaches to support capacity development through technical assistance 
Doing Direct Indirect Hands-off 
Donors use experts 
doing the work 
themselves in order 
to achieve results on 
the ground.  
 
Generally has a 
capacity-substitution 
function. 
 
Development partners 
engaging with country 
partners through joint 
planning to implement 
agreed-upon activities.  
 
Allows for capacity 
development through 
interactions with national 
staff and country 
processes. 
Development partners 
engaging with country 
processes and support 
endogenous initiatives 
and ideas.  
 
Local actors remain in 
charge of the change 
process, external actors 
merely facilitated. 
Development partners 
limiting their intervention 
to paying for proven, 
measurable or 
demonstrated progress. 
 
This approach is 
underused and often not 
associated with CDS. 
Source: Land (2007) 
This evaluation and other recent studies confirm that some interventions may 
successfully mix different approaches, but they also point out the difficulties in 
shifting from direct to more indirect approaches (Land 2007; Morgan 2008b; AusAid 
2011). A further examination of interventions and approaches can be made by 
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distinguishing between the types of learning and knowledge-sharing that the external 
interventions seek to facilitate. Table 3 presents two typologies of different types of 
learning that could be used for this. 
Table 3: Different categorisations of learning 
1) Approaches to learning  
Reproductive learning Communicative learning Transformative learning 
Often needed before other types 
of learning can occur.  
Can be gained in different ways, 
e.g. distance education, self-
study and “mimicking”; yet 
emphasis on formal processes.  
Involves the process of learning 
and applying basic concepts, 
procedures, technical skills, etc.  
No clear knowledge or known 
solutions to identified problems 
are available.  
Emphasis on dynamic processes, 
tends to happen “on the job”. 
A social constructivist approach 
requiring human interaction and 
dialogue. 
Although it can benefit from 
external facilitation, this type is 
by nature “triggered” and 
learner-initiated.  
Driven by realisation that ways 
of knowing and understanding 
are incomplete or incompatible.  
 
2) Learning loops  
Single-loop learning Double-loop learning Triple-loop learning 
Modifying thinking and action 
based on an analysis of 
differences between expectations 
and outcomes.  
Assumes that problems and their 
remedies are close to each other, 
i.e “Are we doing the things 
right?” Does not challenge 
underlying beliefs and 
assumptions. 
Learning through questioning 
and modifying assumptions or 
policies behind expectations, i.e. 
“Are we doing the right things?”  
Requires understanding and 
comparing different points of 
view, and involves learning how 
to learn.  
This involves examining the 
interrelations between problems 
and solutions.  
At an organisational level it 
involves challenging theories of 
change, which involves 
discussing the process of 
conditions of the learning 
process, i.e. “How do we 
determine what is right?” 
Source: Learning approaches: Van der Veen (2000, 16–19); learning loops: De Lange et al. (2011, 38) 
External support involves detailed planning and therefore is less suitable for facilitating 
those types of learning that emerge more spontaneously, given the challenging nature in 
evaluating knowledge-sharing compared to the more tangible and visible results of 
development cooperation. Ineffective or absent ownership can result in inappropriate 
and ineffective approaches. On the side of the developing country, conditions for 
effective learning processes include ownership and articulation of what type of CDS is 
needed (from “doing” to “hands-off”). On the side of the development partner, it 
requires flexible planning and careful monitoring to allow for targeted support to 
learning processes (involving learning on their part), and a need to avoid the temptation 
to offer solutions to preconceived problems.  
As illustrated above, it can be concluded that analysing capacity development from an 
“aid” perspective can run counter to the DAC’s own consensus definition and lead to 
unrealistic expectations and misinterpretations of what is possible through external 
support. A recent paper made three critical observations. First, it observed that past 
research fails to provide a deep analysis of the endogenous nature of capacity 
development. Second, it found that most research takes the perspective of individual 
development interventions, whereas capacity develops through the interaction of 
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multiple internal and external influences. Finally, the paper observes that available 
research insufficiently reflects the perspectives of direct “stakeholders” of the capacity 
development process (Sato 2013).  
There is thus an uneasy match between the “interventionist” nature of the aid- and 
development-effectiveness agenda and the understanding of capacity development as an 
endogenous change process that – only to a limited extent – can be supported from the 
outside and easily outlive the typical development project cycle (Sato 2013; Fowler / 
Ubels 2010). Attempts to simultaneously investigate both the endogenous process and 
the external intervention(s) made have resulted in both confusion and frustration (Horton 
2011, 5). 
Different studies observe that past CDS has been too focused on the individual level and 
has neglected supporting capacity development at the organisational and institutional 
levels (Pearson 2011; Manning 2012; DFID 2008; OECD 2006). Knack argues that 
development results in the social sectors have generated unrealistic expectations on 
development partners’ abilities to contribute to institutional strengthening, while 
observing that international development cooperation can contribute unintentionally to the 
weakening of such institutions (Knack 2012). A similar conclusion was reached by 
Birdsall (2005), who defines impatience with institution-building as the first of seven 
“deadly sins” of development partners and concludes that in ODA-dependent countries, 
the combination of impatience with coordination failure weakens institutions. The next 
section describes how capacity development features in the aid- and development-
effectiveness agenda and how efforts have been made to further operationalise this 
concept.  
3.3 Capacity development in Paris, Accra and Busan 
Capacity development claimed a prominent spot in the Paris Declaration, which 
recognised the need for capacity to allow for the achievement of results, while clearly 
stating that “[c]apacity development is the responsibility of developing countries with 
donors playing a support role. It needs not only to be based on sound technical analysis, 
but also to be responsive to the broader social, political and economic environment, 
including the need to strengthen human resources” (PD 2005, 5).  
In the run-up to the Accra and Busan High-Level Fora, informal networks of stakeholders 
specialised in capacity development convened and adopted written statements in 2008 and 
2011, which respectively became known as the Bonn and Cairo Consensus on Capacity 
Development. These statements mainly sought to raise awareness and influence the 
content of the draft outcome documents of the Accra and Busan High-Level Fora, which 
were under preparation at that time. The 2008 Bonn Consensus had a strong influence on 
the Accra Agenda for Action, which reflected much of its content and wording. In 2011, a 
broader group of actors adopted the Cairo Consensus, which expressed priorities that, in 
substance, were more or less identical to the ones formulated in Bonn three years earlier 
(see Table 4). Although earlier drafts of the outcome document did contain commitments 
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in relation to technical cooperation,9 the final Busan outcome document did not 
substantially add to what was already agreed in Paris and Accra. 
Table 4: Positions on capacity development adopted in Bonn (2008) and Cairo (2011) 10  
Bonn (2008) Cairo (2011) 
Key message: developing countries commit to 
capacity development at all levels; external 
partners strengthen own capacity and adapt 
approaches to deliver responsive support. 
Key message: a shift to an approach that is demand-
driven and results-focused, owned by the country, 
and that builds on existing capacity. 
1: Developing countries integrate capacity 
development as a core element of development 
efforts 
1: Capacity development needs to be at the heart of 
all significant development efforts (covering 
parliaments, media, civil society) 
2: Developing countries take the lead in addressing 
key systemic issues undermining capacity 
development, with external support 
2: Domestic leadership of capacity development is 
essential; existing capacities should be the 
backbone of any capacity development initiative 
3: Developing countries to exercise ownership of 
technical assistance 
3: Supply-driven technical cooperation rarely 
builds sustainable capacity  
4: Joint commitment to support capacity 
development of civil society and private sector 
4: We will involve state and non-state actors 
(parliaments, media, civil society) 
5: In situations of fragility, external partners will 
provide tailored, long-term, coordinated support 
5: Capacity development is a top priority for all 
developing countries and especially countries 
affected by fragility 
6: Strengthen efforts to expand capacity 
development knowledge and apply good practice 
6: Systematic learning on what works and what 
does not is key to improved capacity 
Source: Own compilation (Bonn Consensus 2008; Cairo Consensus 2011) 
In addition to the wealth of capacity development studies that are available, ongoing 
governance research initiatives result in findings that are relevant for improving CDS, and 
show similarities with earlier capacity development research. Four commonalities can be 
identified: (1) both the capacity and governance research streams seek to operationalise 
rather general overarching concepts by distinguishing specific inter-related dimensions; 
(2) both give increasing attention to the need to improve the understanding of the political 
economy of development processes; (3) both point to a limited role for external support in 
facilitating development; (4) both criticise supply-driven and normative approaches to 
development (i.e. “good governance”) and emphasise the need to promote genuine 
demand-led and tailor-made approaches (Grindle 2005; Booth 2012; Centre for the Future 
State 2010; Baser / Morgan 2008; Woodhill 2010).  
                                                            
9  The second draft, dated on 16 September 2011, read under paragraph 14(a): “Developing countries will 
lead in articulating their needs and providers of co-operation will support them, basing their efforts on 
agreed plans. Providers of co-operation will refrain from pursuing supply-driven technical assistance 
and undermining existing capacities. They will channel support to demand-driven and needs-based 
initiatives, recognising that capacity development encompasses both institutional and human resource 
development.” Source: http://cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/second_draft_busan_outcome_document. 
pdf (accessed 15 Aug. 2013). 
10 Most text presented is directly drawn from the documents but not presented as quotes for readability 
reasons. The order of the action points differs from the original documents to enable comparison.  
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Inputs Modalities Instruments 
Goods
Services
Cash 
Project support
Multi -Donor Trust
Fund
Adaptation of
modalities as per 
development 
partner or partner
country
requirements
(e.g. procurement, 
earmarking and
traceability, input or
result  based, M&E 
requirements)
Sector Budget Support
General Budget
Support
Common pool or
basket fund
Both research streams support and inform the continuing policy priority given to 
strengthening institutions, which is also highlighted in the report of the High-Level Panel 
on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (HLP 2013). Having looked into the efforts to 
operationalise capacity development as a concept in development cooperation, the next 
sub-section presents and discusses the means that development partners use to support 
capacity development.  
3.4 Supporting capacity development: technical cooperation as the dominant 
modality 
A logical consequence of the broad definition of capacity development and its strong link 
to ownership is that there is no such thing as “capacity-neutral” development 
interventions. One can argue that development interventions can roughly be separated into 
two groups. The first group of interventions supports capacity development in order to 
achieve results (i.e. capacity as a means to development results). The second group of 
interventions provides support to capacity as its key objective (i.e. capacity as an end in 
itself). One should not conclude that the latter group of interventions, by definition, makes 
a more significant contribution to supporting capacity development than the latter. It may 
well be the case that some interventions that were not designed with a primary capacity 
development purpose end up making strong contributions in that regard, e.g. the provision 
of General Budget Support (IDD et al. 2006). The explicit mandate given to the former 
group of interventions, however, allows for a more detailed examination of how they are 
designed and implemented to support capacity development, which is why this paper 
focuses on this group.  
International development partners can support capacity development in different ways 
(Figure 1):  
Figure 1: Options for supporting capacity development 
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Source: Own elaboration, based on Sprietzer and Vargas (2011); Janus (2012) 
Figure 1 stresses that aid modalities are not uniform or static, but are adapted and 
transposed into context-specific CDS instruments through the interaction between 
development partners and developing-country stakeholders. In most cases the 
development partners have the most control over the terms of cooperation (Klingebiel 
2013). The Paris Declaration introduced the term “programme-based approaches” 
(PBAs) to promote the use of its cooperation principles at the level of individual 
development instruments. The Declaration defined PBAs as a “way of engaging in 
development cooperation based on the principle of co-ordinated support for a locally 
owned programme of development” (OECD in SIDA 2008, 6). While being targeted at 
development cooperation as a whole, the term “PBAs” has, in practice, become 
narrowed down to the use of so-called new aid modalities (e.g. pooled funding, budget 
support). Using the term “programme-based approach” in the singular would have been 
better to emphasise that any modality could be used in a way that meets the criteria that 
measure, among other things, whether host country/organisations exercise leadership 
and whether local systems, such as planning and procurement processes, are used.11 
Though adopted in 2005, these principles also remain relevant for today’s cooperation, 
including the recent emphasis on results-based aid (see Box 1).  
Box 1: Capacity development and results-based aid 
The ongoing discussions, experimentation and gradual upscaling of results-based aid (RBA) has 
important implications for capacity development in developing countries. Recent studies suggest that the 
use of RBA, i.e. the disbursement of external investments in the forms of grants or loans once 
predetermined results have been achieved and verified, can have positive influences on state-society 
accountability relations by incentivising effective public service delivery (Klingebiel 2012).  
Similar to other forms of earmarking through development cooperation, a potential disadvantage is that it 
can distort a developing-country government’s public sector by making it prioritise RBA-funded results 
over those that are not (Klingebiel 2012, 15). In addition to public sector performance, this may also 
overstretch their capacity, which is, however, challenging to assess because patterns of both capacity 
development and performance are typically uneven and asynchronous. One can therefore best analyse 
performance as “an emergent pattern that comes about through the interactions of many elements both 
internal and external” (Baser / Morgan 2008, 88). Notwithstanding the absence of a direct link, the 
literature emphasises the importance of interventions to be “capacity-sensitive”. Promoting results while 
assuming that “capacity will follow” – or worse, by implying that the development of such capacity is not 
relevant – can reinforce capability traps or cause “institutional confusion” (Dijkstra 2013, 19; Andrews / 
Pritchett / Woolcock 2012). 
Most external support dedicated to support capacity development uses the project support 
modality and is grouped under the general heading of technical cooperation. The origin of 
this term goes back to the very first session of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 1946, during which TC was recognised as a necessary complement to the 
transfer of financial and material resources that were committed to (Bossuyt / Laporte / 
Van Hoek 1995). The term covers a wide amalgam of interventions that includes short- 
and long-term personnel, training and research, twinning,12 peer support and associated 
costs. The use of short- and long-term personnel is also referred to as technical assistance 
                                                            
11  See SIDA (2008, 20–21) for a full overview of these principles. 
12 Twinning involves facilitating exchange of knowledge and experience between two or more organisations. 
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(TA), a subset of TC.13 The total amount of TC provided through ODA is estimated at 
US$ 25 billion per year in 2010 (Hradsky et al. 2010), while other studies estimate it at 25 
per cent of global ODA (DFID 2013; Morris / Pryke 2011; Hradsky et al. 2010). 
Determining what proportion of the overall volume of TC contributes to supporting 
capacity development processes is, however, a complicated matter.  
International development statistics do not differentiate between TC and TA, but instead 
distinguish between two types of TC grants: (1) free-standing technical cooperation 
(FTC), which is the provision of resources aimed at the transfer of technical and 
managerial skills or of technology for the purpose of building up general national 
capacity without reference to the implementation of any specific investment projects; 
and (2) investment-related technical cooperation, which is the provision of technical 
services required for the implementation of specific investment projects (IMF in OECD 
2007; OECD 2006; OECD 2010a). 
The FTC category is a problematic one for research on capacity development. First of all, 
support reported as FTC is far too heterogeneous to merit a conclusion that all support 
seeks to promote “national capacity development by means of a transfer of skills.” While 
funding for students, volunteers, training equipment, consultants and researchers can no 
doubt be useful, it does not automatically contribute towards helping developing countries 
“unlock, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time” (OECD 2006, 12). 
FTC can, for instance, involve development partners flying in their experts to lead on the 
preparation of development projects, often under demanding, short time-frames. Secondly, 
some development partners have gradually integrated capacity-development-oriented 
technical cooperation components into larger (often project) interventions that are not 
reported as FTC. For those interventions, it is hard to assess what proportion is dedicated 
to support capacity development (Hauck / Souto 2007; NORAD 2010). 
The ambiguity in FTC reporting has been recognised by the OECD for some time. In 2006 
the former DAC Chair Richard Manning acknowledged that “a good deal of what the 
DAC scores as TC has little to do with capacity Development” (OECD 2006, 23). 
Although FTC continues to be reported on until today, in 2009 the Reporting Directives 
were updated to include reporting on eight “types of aid” (OECD 2009). One stated reason 
for introducing the classification was to disaggregate reporting on TC.14 Annex 1 to this 
paper presents an overview of ODA per type of aid for the periods 2010 and 2011. It helps 
in gaining an insight into the proportion of FTC-reported activities that concern 
expenditure on donor country personnel, technical assistance, scholarships / training and 
imputed student costs. Most of the FTC-reported activities, however, fall under the larger 
category of “project-type interventions”, which is by far the largest of all 15 types of aid. 
This category includes, for instance, CDS delivered by multilateral and civilateral 
organisations and cannot be disaggregated further, and it seriously limits the potential of 
the types of aid categorisation to disaggregate FTC expenditure. 
                                                            
13  Despite this difference, the terms “technical cooperation” and “technical assistance” are often used 
interchangeably in the literature. The term TC in this paper should mainly be understood as restricted to 
long- or short-term experts, trainings and workshops and twinning. TA is used as a synonym for TC if 
this was the case in the references cited.  
14  See: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dacstatisticsanewclassificationbytypeofaid.htm (accessed 30 
Jul. 2013). 
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Despite the improved information on the proportion of some TC expenditure, one remains 
with a general picture of technical cooperation as roughly a quarter of world-wide ODA, 
of which the contribution to capacity development is opaque and hard to measure for 
multiple reasons: (a) it is not clear whether all support reported as FTC seeks to contribute 
to capacity development, and if so to what extent; (b) when capacity development is the 
purpose, baselines are often missing, objectives defined for the support are frequently hard 
to measure and, even when they are clear, the monitoring is incomplete; and (c) 
independent evaluation investments in CDS are relatively low compared to other types of 
development interventions and often not available in the public domain.15 
The low levels of investment made in evaluating the results of technical cooperation are a 
striking feature. The frequent baseline and monitoring deficiencies of capacity 
development interventions effectively disable independent evaluations that seek to assess 
the contribution of such projects at the level of what is defined as outcomes and impact 
(IEG 2005; IEG 2008; De Lange et al. 2011). In addition to a lack of a knowledge base as 
to what works or does not work in CDS, the underinvestment in evaluation also obscures 
the possible perverse effects of current approaches. Such perverse effects also influence 
developing-country stakeholders’ understanding of “capacity development”. Such 
misperceptions are particularly linked to CDS that is offered through training and 
workshops (see also Box 2).  
Box 2: Capacity development means workshops and per diems? 
Reflecting on decades of development cooperation in Tanzania, Rajani (2010) identifies three reasons as 
to why past capacity development projects have generally failed. First of all, the support concentrates on 
the design phase of the policy cycle (laws, policies) while neglecting implementation. Second, the support 
provided is supply-driven, in the sense that the agenda and the analysis underlying it are predominantly 
shaped by those who commission, design and deliver the support. Third, there has been limited 
evaluation, resulting in approaches being labelled “new” and “innovative” when in reality these repeat 
what has been tried before. Tanzanian participants are thus unconvinced of the value of these exercises, 
which is why external inducements such as sitting allowances, top-up pay and per diems have become the 
main incentives for people to participate.  
A recent evaluation commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) 
similarly concludes that these allowances create powerful incentives for “turning donor-funded projects 
into exercises of repetitive ‘capacity-building’, where most funds are spent on costly seminars and 
workshops of doubtful effectiveness and relevance to project output and long-term impact” (Søreide / 
Tostensen / Skage 2012, 96). The evaluation observes that development partners are typically quick to 
suggest capacity-building as part of a strategy to improve service delivery. Although organising a training 
programme can leave the organisers with a sense of achievement, robust evaluation of these activities is 
the exception rather than the rule. In most cases no pre-assessment is made to determine the level of 
competence and capacity before the training is done, while in most cases ex post assessment is done 
through end-of-workshop surveys. Further investment and improvement in evaluations may help to 
differentiate between useful and useless training and signal cases of per diem misuse (Søreide / Tostensen 
/ Skage  2012, 96). This would also help to change local perceptions of capacity development. 
One way forward would be to disaggregate the technical cooperation statistics and 
separate genuine support to capacity development from support given to other legitimate 
                                                            
15  General budget support (IDD et al. 2006) and sector budget support (Williamson / Dom 2010) have 
been subject to high-profile joint evaluations, while accounting for lower proportions of ODA. Another 
indication is that financial cooperation providers generally publish project evaluations on their 
websites, whereas technical cooperation agencies as a rule do not disclose such evaluations.  
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purposes. Recent TC guidelines produced by the European Commission (EC) present a 
useful distinction of four purposes for technical cooperation: (1) Capacity development 
TC (of organisations and individuals); (2) Policy and advisory TC (providing policy 
and/or expert advice, or making other knowledge products available); (3) Implementation 
TC (strengthening implementation of services, investments, regulatory activities); (4) 
Preparatory TC (preparation / facilitation of EC cooperation). The EC considers capacity 
development to be the primary aim of TC and stresses the need to make an explicit choice 
for one or more of the four purposes transparent in the support as designed and delivered. 
This would help avoid having TC be claimed to support capacity development when in 
fact this is not the case (EC 2009, 10).16 The EC categories are useful but should be made 
more operationalised, e.g. they were not applied in a study to prepare the EC’s 
methodology for evaluating technical cooperation (DRN 2012). 
This section identified deficient reporting, evaluation gaps and the related absence of a 
knowledge base on the effectiveness of CDS as reasons for the lack of fundamental reform 
in dominant approaches to CDS – as found by a large body of studies. The next section 
further analyses the observed reform-resistance of approaches to CDS. 
3.5 Interrogating the reform-resistance of capacity development support 
Strong investments have been made in recent years to learn how change does or does not 
happen in developing countries as a means to improve development interventions. 
Development partners who invest in such political economy analyses have, to date, 
generally failed to use them to make fundamental changes in their interventions (Booth 
2012). It has been pointed out that “the political economy of donor countries themselves 
often makes it difficult for evidence and lessons to be taken on board and applied, or 
tricky for governance issues to be adequately addressed. Here too there is a need to look 
at the incentives involved, the underlying interests, and the blockages and opportunities 
that might be presented” (Cronin 2013). 
One key criticism of the aid- and development-effectiveness agenda as a whole is that it 
misrepresents the formulation and implementation of development policies as a technical 
process aiming to identify and optimally implement effective interventions in support of 
internationally agreed development outcomes. In reality the objective of providing 
optimally effective development assistance has to coexist with a range of other objectives 
and considerations, e.g. geopolitical, security and commercial objectives. Stakeholders 
who are on the “recipient” end of development cooperation obviously also balance various 
objectives in the management of their affairs, including external inputs provided. Many 
stakeholders may not be convinced of the need to introduce all changes agreed in Paris.  
Many studies observe that development partners have made only timid and tentative steps 
towards reforming their approaches to supporting capacity development, and that a 
significant proportion of support fails to respond to the criticisms of the past, e.g. by 
continuing to be supply-driven, tied, or insufficiently monitored and evaluated (e.g. 
                                                            
16  Earlier studies made such efforts, e.g. a study on Nordic technical assistance personnel found that 65 
per cent of the technical assistance personnel assessed were implementing project goals (Forss 1990 in 
Bossuyt / Laporte / Van Hoek 1995, 21). 
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ActionAid International 2011; OECD 2006; World Bank 2001; Bossuyt / Laporte / Van 
Hoek 1995; Land 2007; Land / Morgan 2008; Whitfield 2009b; Lawson et al. 2012; 
Whitfield 2009a). Morgan (2008a) observes a paradox whereby most development 
partners and countries want to improve the performance of TA, but fail to achieve major 
gains. Actual reform is rather slow and incremental and tends to provide a basis for a new 
wave of criticism, resulting in a cycle of “criticism-discussion-reform-dissatisfaction-
criticism” (Morgan 2008a, 2).  
The slow changes in internalising and realising the aid-effectiveness agenda in the area 
of CDS can be explained in relation to the interests of the ODA delivery system itself. In 
a recent analysis of German ODA allocation and partner-country selection, Faust and 
Ziaja (2012, 7) refer to what Easterly (2002) has dubbed the “cartel of good intentions”. 
In many OECD countries, implementing agencies involved in the management of the 
ODA budget have developed special interests of their own that may go against certain 
elements of the aid- and development-effectiveness agenda (Easterly 2002). Faust and 
Messner (2007, 7) add that “organizations – as collective actors – have a major and 
fundamental interest in securing both their own survival and the greatest possible 
autonomy for their actions.” Given these interests, they tend to only selectively provide 
information to the principal(s) that use them as an intermediary to deliver development 
cooperation. At a more general level, serious principal-agent problems lead to 
development actors seeking to demonstrate success while using unfilled objectives to 
demand more funds (Faust / Messner 2007; Wood 2003). 
In addition to institutional interests and related path-dependency of support, another 
possible reason why ineffective practices persist is that existing instruments perform 
very well in developing the capacities of the individuals who are supposed to facilitate 
the capacity development of others. In addition to serving the individuals, the practices 
may also indirectly serve those who contract them. Development cooperation agencies 
are known to be poor learners, as they are plagued by frequent job changes and internal 
transfer as a major path for promotion; a politicised design process that obscures the 
process of designing development interventions; and higher attention to project 
identification and appraisal over supervision, monitoring and evaluation (Berg 2000). 
Development agencies moreover often face a “capital city trap” that keeps many 
officials from direct exposure to the “field” in any significant way (Manning 2012; 
Chambers 2006; Booth 2013). This creates a need for technical assistants to serve as the 
agency’s “eyes and ears” in the “field”, which often results in such assistants acquiring 
informal aid-management tasks that go beyond, or even against, their formal mandates.  
The importance of technical cooperation for development partners, as opposed to for 
capacity development, may explain the absence of a functioning “market” for technical 
cooperation. Available studies point out that the costs of TC only influence supply and 
demand to a limited degree, whereas the practice of providing almost all of it in the form 
of grants leaves the question of developing countries’ willingness to pay for CDS 
unanswered (Keijzer 2013). Three practices in particular distort the market: the tying of 
assistance, bundling assistance into larger intervention packages and fragmentation of 
support (OPM 2003). The practice of tying is the most contentious of these three and 
receives most attention in the literature.  
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Aid tying is defined as development partners providing assistance under the condition 
that certain goods and services are purchased from firms “at home”, or directly involve 
stakeholders in the country providing the development assistance, e.g. universities or the 
private sector (Radelet 2006, 7). In 2009, 64 per cent of all bilateral technical 
cooperation was reported as untied, 22 per cent was tied, while the status of the 
remaining 14 per cent was not reported (OECD 2011 in DFID 2013, 19). One 
proclaimed rationale for tying is that it increases public support to development 
cooperation, which some development partners have indeed purposefully promoted in the 
past.17 While such intended effects may or may not occur, tying of development 
cooperation is known to reduce the effectiveness of development cooperation: (1) it 
undermines ownership of the development process by placing purchasing decisions in the 
hands of development partners; (2) it decreases value for money by increasing the costs of 
supply; and (3) it fails to boost the national socio-economic fabric by not sourcing 
supplies and advisory services through the local economy (Ellmers 2011, 13; World Bank 
2001, 200; Clay / Geddes / Natali 2009).  
In 2001 the DAC adopted recommendations on untying assistance, which excluded FTC 
from the tying reporting requirements (Clay / Geddes / Natali 2009). A recent OECD 
report discusses the additional untying commitments made in Accra and Busan and 
concludes that they “in no way alter or expand the coverage of the 2001 
Recommendation.” The OECD members agreed that, in the end, it is up to each member 
to decide how to interpret the agreements made in Accra and Busan and determine any 
further steps (OECD 2013, 6). 
The reform resistance and lack of effectiveness of CDS can also be explained by the 
underinvestment of many developing countries in human resource development, and in 
particular in ensuring functioning and functional education systems. These and other 
factors have contributed to strong performance disincentives among civil servants 
(Wohlgemuth 2005). These disincentives were partly shaped by economic collapse during 
the 1980s and slow growth during the 1990s, which resulted in a cadre of “under-paid, 
insecure and demoralized public sector officials.” Given these persisting challenges, some 
argue that the continuing prominence and priority of capacity development in 
development cooperation “is more a sign of previous failure than anything else” 
(Wohlgemuth 2005, 16).18 If countries had seriously invested in human resource 
development, there would have been a better local market for technical assistance, which 
would have reduced the tendency to rely on the “resident expatriate local counterpart 
model” (Berg 2000, 26).  
In countries that are highly dependent on ODA, the lack of improvement in capacity 
development at the organisational and institutional levels can result in the failure of the 
public service to enable key staff to operate productively, as well as to attract and retain 
                                                            
17  One example is the Danish government, which, during the 1960s, purposively tied a portion of the 
budget to the Danish private sector. This resulted in increased political support by influential business 
federations to Danish development cooperation (Lundsgaarde 2013, 53–55). 
18  A recent report observed that, in the Philippines, a combination of uncompetitive civil service salaries 
and political influence over appointments have had profound consequences on the public sector’s 
capacity. As a result, neighbouring countries that were once on par with the country have now left the 
Philippines behind, which continues to rely substantially on technical assistance (AusAid 2010a, 5, 10).  
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such staff (Manning 2012, 19). In such situations, technical assistance may resort to 
unsustainable gap-filling practices, particularly when the perceived net present value of a 
direct intervention is greater than the net present value of delaying the intervention, so as 
to associate local technicians with the process (Grey in Godfrey et al. 2002, 356). In the 
case of Cambodia, unsustainable technical assistance practices included competition 
between development partners, who felt pressured to provide additional financial 
allowances when offering trainings and capacity development programmes (Godfrey et al. 
2002). While this article thus observed a vicious cycle involving a chronically 
underfunded government and limited capacity development gains, another study 
conducted six years later presented evidence of changes in behaviour of both the 
government and its international partners. It noted a stronger emphasis on capacity 
development, better management and agenda articulation by government and increased 
coordination performance. At the same time, the study identified that many opportunities 
for positive change remained untapped, both with the development partners and with the 
government. A stronger involvement of government in identifying, contracting and 
managing support was considered a key means to move forward (Land / Morgan 2008).  
At the time it was adopted, one of the most ambitious commitments included in the Paris 
Declaration was increasing the use of developing countries’ own systems and procedures 
in development cooperation. This was linked to general commitments for reducing the 
tying of aid and seen as a key means to enable government leadership over development 
cooperation in partner countries that were strongly dependent on ODA. The next section 
analyses these commitments in detail and the research evidence on applying them in the 
field of CDS.  
4 Capacity development support through developing country systems 
4.1 Country systems and external support 
Although the term has featured in discussions on aid and development effectiveness since 
the early 2000s, the question of what is meant with “country systems” is actually not 
straightforward. The Paris Declaration uses the term “country systems and procedures”, 
which it defines as including, but not being limited to, “national arrangements and 
procedures for public financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, results 
frameworks and monitoring” (PD 2005, 4). Another paragraph of the Declaration lists 
public financial management, procurement, fiduciary safeguards and environmental 
assessments as examples of country systems (PD 2005, 1). The Declaration’s monitoring 
framework further narrows the operationalisation of country systems to two indicators 
covering the quality of developing countries’ PFM and the use of procurement systems by 
development partners. This has led to misinterpretations of the concept of “country 
systems” as primarily referring to financial systems (Glennie et al. 2012).  
Instead of this prevalent narrow understanding, the commitment to using country systems 
should be interpreted in relation to the Declaration’s key objective of developing countries 
taking charge of their own development processes, for which external support is but one of 
many ingredients. The Declaration’s signatories assume that using country systems in 
development cooperation will in itself contribute to strengthening such systems. Doing so 
would lead to the development partner adopting elements of “the accountability 
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framework that links recipient citizens with their governments” (Rogerson 2005, 535). To 
this end, the Declaration includes additional commitments by development partners to 
support developing countries in their efforts to strengthen their “capacity to plan, manage, 
implement, and account for results of policies and programmes” (PD 2005, 5).  
When it comes to the specific area of CDS, interventions can be further grouped in relation to 
(1) the extent to which the CDS provided seeks to directly strengthen country systems or 
pursues other objectives, and (2) the extent to which the interventions are planned, 
implemented and evaluated through country systems. Capacity development interventions 
thus differ on the extent to which they directly and purposefully seek to contribute to the 
strengthening of country systems (i.e. support “to” country systems) and to what extent they 
seek to purposefully strengthen these systems by using them (i.e. support “through” country 
systems).19 
Available research evidence does not directly tackle the challenge of how to provide 
capacity development to and through country systems. Only a handful of studies deals 
with the “how” of designing CDS of country systems (e.g. Ecorys 2011), while a larger 
body of research takes a macro-level perspective on the extent to which development 
cooperation makes use of country systems. Given this paper’s focus, sections 4.2 and 4.3 
will first examine overall policy trends, incentives and performance in the use of country 
systems, followed by a more detailed analysis of CDS through country systems. 
4.2 Country systems: commitments and how to measure them 
The Paris Declaration’s commitments on using country systems were subject to 
considerable debate in the run-up to the Accra High-Level Forum in 2008, resulting in its 
outcome document’s call for using country systems as the “default option” in development 
cooperation and a list of actions for development partners: transparent decision-making; 
conducting joint analysis with developing countries; and developing their own capacity to 
work through country systems. Last but not least, development partners resolved to “aim 
to channel 50% or more of government-to-government assistance through country 
fiduciary systems” (AAA 2008, 3). In the run-up towards Busan, partner countries 
expressed disappointment on the lack of real change and pushed for further commitments 
(Partner Country Contact Group 2011). The Busan outcome document, however, did not 
increase the level of ambition and instead implicitly legitimises differences in performance 
between development partners, as per the agreement to use “country systems as the 
default approach for development cooperation in support of activities managed by the 
public sector, working with and respecting the governance structures of both the provider 
of development cooperation and the developing country” (Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation 2011, 5).  
Policy discussions in the run-up to these fora benefited substantially from detailed studies 
that sought to operationalise and monitor what had been agreed. A study for the 
                                                            
19  The words “to” and “through” are also used in Glennie et al. (2012) as well as in OECD discussions on 
providing support to and through non-governmental organisations.   
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Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) distinguished between eight 
components of using country systems (Table 5).20  
Development partners can use country systems in various degrees for each individual 
instrument that they manage. Their policies can establish principles for the (non-)use of 
specific components for cooperation in general, or for specific aid modalities. The type of 
inputs used for cooperation also matters in this regard. In most developing countries, the 
use of concessional loans requires the involvement of parliament and therefore uses some 
aspects of country systems by default, whereas for grants this is also the case when modal 
ities such as budget support are used. It becomes more complicated when assistance is not 
provided in the form of cash but as goods or services, as these inputs would, for instance, 
first have to be costed before they could be reflected in a government’s budget.  
Table 5: Eight components of using country systems in development cooperation 
1) Planning External financing is integrated in plans and budget requests 
2) Budget External financing is reported in budget documentation 
3) Parliament External financing is included in appropriations approved by parliament 
4) Treasury External financing is disbursed into the main treasury account and managed through government’s systems 
5) Procurement Externally-financed procurement follows government standards and procedures 
6) Accounting External financing is recorded and accounted for in government accounting system, in line with chart of accounts 
7) Auditing External financing is audited by the supreme audit institution 
8) Reporting External financing is included in ex post reports  
Source: Adapted from Sprietzer and Vargas (2011, 47) 
The commitments and monitoring indicators agreed in Paris and Accra recognise that the 
nature and quality of country systems need to be measured in order to inform decisions on to 
what extent they can be used in development cooperation. Paragraph 19(b) of Busan calls for 
joint and mutually agreed assessments of country systems, but notes that “providers of 
development co-operation will decide on the extent to which they can use country systems.” 
As they also make the eventual judgement, many development partners also make 
independent decisions on which approaches to use to measure the quality of country systems. 
Moreover, they show considerable differences in assessment practices (Sprietzer / Vargas 
2011, 24). Instead of choosing one particular approach, developing countries and their 
external partners can also compile a “dashboard” of indicators that are deemed a best fit to 
monitor the development of PFM in the country concerned (De Renzio 2013). Table 6 
presents a number of examples of monitoring approaches that are used by different 
development partners. 
Table 6: Available approaches to monitor public finance management 
Country Policy and 
Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) 
The CPIA is managed by the World Bank and rates countries against a set of 16 
criteria, grouped into four clusters: (a) economic management; (b) structural 
policies; (c) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (d) public sector 
management and institutions. 
                                                            
20  An earlier publication by CABRI (2009) discerned seven components and excluded “procurement”.  
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Public Expenditure 
and Financial 
Accountability 
(PEFA) 
The PEFA programme is a multi-donor partnership between seven development-
partner agencies and international financial institutions to assess the condition of 
country public expenditure, procurement and financial accountability systems 
and develop a sequence for reform and capacity development.  
Open Budget Index 
(OBI) 
The Open Budget Initiative, a global research and advocacy campaign, manages 
the Open Budget Index. This index assigns a score to each country based on the 
information it makes available to the public throughout the budget process. The 
index is published annually. 
OECD International 
Database of Budget 
Practices and 
Procedures (DBPP) 
This database contains the results of the 2007 OECD survey of budget practices 
and procedures in OECD countries; the 2008 World Bank / OECD survey of 
budget practices and procedures in Asia and other regions; and the 2008 CABRI 
/ OECD survey of budget practices and procedures in Africa. 
Methodology for 
Assessing 
Procurement 
Systems (MAPS) 
This is the official Paris Declaration measure for assessing the quality of 
procurement systems, based on a methodology developed by the OECD. Due to 
its low sample size and one-off nature of the assessment, it is not useful for 
monitoring a country system’s quality in its current form. 
Source: Own compilation 
Given the observed low level of performance of – and disappointment over – the use of 
country systems in development cooperation (Wood et al. 2011), it is worth taking a closer 
look at incentives and disincentives to use these systems.  
4.3 (Dis)incentives for using country systems 
Despite the consensus on the development benefits of doing so, development partners 
have lagged in implementing their commitments on using country systems, particularly 
those in relation to procurement. A recent survey found that only 20 per cent of the 
responding development partners use country systems as the first option. Other 
development partners follow a “can use as long as” approach, whereby assessments are 
used to determine whether certain approaches can be used in certain countries (Sprietzer / 
Vargas 2011). Several studies observe a weak correlation between the quality of countries’ 
systems and the use thereof by development partners (CABRI 2009; Ellmers 2011; 
Sprietzer / Vargas 2011; IEG 2011). The lack of a clear correlation between the quality of 
developing-country systems and the use thereof by development partners confirms that 
development partners do not just decide based on the perceived risk levels and quality of 
the systems. Instead of supposedly objective assessments, the political dynamics “at 
home” strongly inform development-partner decisions to take or avoid risks perceived in 
using country systems (Giubilo 2012). 
A recent World Bank Working Paper reached a different conclusion, namely that 
development partners’ use of country systems is positively and significantly correlated to 
the quality of these systems.21 The paper’s assessment was based over a period of several 
years and combined Paris Declaration monitoring data with CPIA scores and the Bank’s 
Control of Corruption indicator (Knack 2013). Although the findings point to a link 
between the quality of systems and the use thereof by development partners, it is 
suggested that this effect may be temporary and particularly related to the “peer pressure” 
                                                            
21  This conclusion was found not to apply to the United States, France and the UN system (Knack 2013, 7). 
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created by the Paris Declaration and related international commitments. In the absence of 
such peer pressure, future decisions on using systems will be more strongly influenced by 
subjective assessments of risks (Knack 2013, 29). Although reaching a different 
conclusion than other papers, the analysis in Knack (2013) suffers from similar 
limitations, namely the use of Paris Declaration monitoring data and the related use of the 
contested World Bank CPIA index for determining the quality of country system.22  
Despite the widespread conviction that using country systems for development 
cooperation strengthens these systems, development-partner incentives to using such 
systems is low. One reason to explain this is that the benefits of using country systems are 
mostly external (i.e. benefiting other development partners) and long-term, whereas the 
costs are short-term and fully internalised by the development partner concerned. Support 
through country systems thus largely becomes the provision of a public good for other 
development partners (Knack 2012, 6).  
In addition to this “prisoner’s dilemma” (Danielson et al. 2002, 165), four development-
partner disincentives to the use of country systems on the part of development partners can 
be discerned: (a) higher overhead and management costs compared to using development-
partner systems, (b) perceived higher fiduciary risks involved, (c) reduced possibilities for 
pursuing goals other than poverty reduction in general, and possibilities for aid tying in 
particular, (d) reduced visibility of external contributions and increased difficulty in 
communicating the contributions to parliament home constituencies (i.e. the development 
partner’s own “country systems”) (Knack 2013; Sprietzer / Vargas 2011).  
Some developing countries may themselves prefer development cooperation to be 
delivered outside their systems because assistance using their own systems has been found 
to be slow in materialising, more demanding in management terms, and frequently less 
predictable (Sprietzer / Vargas 2011, 27). More frequently, it is argued that uncoordinated 
and parallel development cooperation creates incentives for higher ranks of the public 
service and other elite groups in society, e.g. access to trainings and the benefits these 
bring, as well as to project-funded hardware (Danielson et al. 2002). In many countries, 
the central planning and finance ministries are more in favour of centralised approaches to 
development cooperation that use country systems, while line ministries may prefer more 
fragmented cooperation that allows for direct relations with development partners.  
These incentives partly explain why developing countries and their partners who de jure 
commit to strengthening country systems may de facto show practices that weaken such 
systems, e.g. by creating parallel delivery structures or “poaching” competent staff from 
the public service for project delivery (Klingebiel / Mahn 2011, 4). Combined with other 
negative aspects of development cooperation such as fragmentation of development 
cooperation, the sum effect of ODA on bureaucratic quality in developing countries 
appears to be negative (Dijkstra 2013, 18; Faust / Messner 2007). The next section 
assesses further to what extent this general picture also manifests itself in the area of CDS. 
                                                            
22  Dijkstra (2011) argues that the World Bank’s decision to make the CPIA tool public in 2005 stimulates 
countries to improve ratings as a means to improve aid allocation, whereas the index has been criticised 
for being normative and for promoting policy changes that are not likely to promote economic growth. 
A detailed analysis by Van Wayenberghe (2009) concludes that the CPIA ultimately reflects the idea 
that less government intervention is always better.  
Niels Keijzer 
30 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
4.4 Using country systems to support capacity development 
4.4.1 Capacity development support through country systems: commitments to 
change 
Although there is adequate research evidence on the use of country systems in 
development cooperation – including the monitoring surveys and external evaluations of 
the Paris Declaration – there is an important research gap on the use of country systems 
for interventions to support capacity development. A recent literature review notes that 
past reviews of capacity development interventions generally do not consider the 
importance of using country systems for the effectiveness of such support, or indicate that, 
despite using these systems, the interventions were nonetheless ineffective (Glennie et al. 
2013, 34).  
The relative absence of research evidence contrasts with substantial attention to this topic 
in international policy discussions. Three years before the Paris Declaration was adopted, 
the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey called for efforts to 
“enhance recipient countries’ input into and ownership of the design, including 
procurement, of technical assistance programmes; and increase the effective use of local 
technical assistance resources” (UN 2002). Similar intentions were expressed in Accra: 
technical cooperation should be jointly selected and managed, and the use of local and 
regional resources should be promoted (AAA 2008, 2). In the run-up to Busan, a statement 
adopted by 19 developing countries and 13 development partners in Thailand could not do 
more but repeat these commitments, while emphasising that “[o]wnership must 
meaningfully exist where Technical Cooperation is undertaken” (Bangkok Call to Action 
2011). In a similar vein, the Partner Country Contact Group published a position paper in 
the run-up to Busan that called on development partners to “refrain from pursuing supply‐
driven technical assistance (despite good intentions) and to respond to our demand‐driven 
and need‐based initiatives” (Partner Country Contact Group 2011, 7). 
The next three sub-sections analyse the literature in relation to the following key questions 
on the extent to which CDS uses country systems, each of these grouping the components 
for the use of country systems, as introduced in Table 5:  
• How do countries articulate demand for CDS and how is this operationalised into 
specific interventions? (components 1–3) 
• How is the support procured and provided? (4–6) 
• How is the support monitored and evaluated? (7 and 8) 
4.4.2 Articulation of demand and the design of capacity development support 
The articulation of demand is a first and essential step for ownership of the support by the 
partner country. If preparation at this early stage is inadequate, it is unlikely to be 
“repaired” downstream. Participation of developing-country stakeholders in formulating 
TC projects is, however, frequently inadequate, among other reasons because organising 
this requires substantial resources and time by all involved (Keijzer 2013). Although these 
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insights are far from new, terms of reference (ToR) drawn up by development partners too 
often fail to clarify lines of accountability between the funder, provider and recipient of 
support, or in worst cases do not give a single recipient actor authority over the support 
programme. Moreover, even when ToR are clear, development partners’ actions often 
undermine the written agreement by seeking direct management of the support (Morton 
2003, 11). This has been recognised in more recent years, and some development partners 
now make capacity development projects fully accountable and answerable to developing-
country authorities, whereas others promote hybrid approaches (Land 2007; Land / 
Morgan 2008). 
CDS is most often provided as a grant, frequently with a lack of detail on the specific 
budgets involved. Whereas using loans or introducing co-financing would test countries’ 
willingness to pay for support and often require approval by parliament and be reflected in 
the government budget, this is not automatically the case with grants (Keijzer 2013, 3). 
The tendency of technical cooperation to be provided as a component of larger grant-
based interventions often results in a “take-it-or-leave-it” option for governments. Land 
and Morgan (2008, 17) note that fear of losing access to external cooperation is one of the 
main reasons for the phenomenon of “tolerated TC”. It also leads to perceptions of TC as 
being a “free good”, which is incorrect because of the developing country’s incurred costs 
in managing the assistance provided (e.g. office space, use of facilities, counterparts) 
(OECD 2006). The fact that TC remains a disputed component of the OECD’s concept of 
Country Programmable Aid (CPA)23 indicates that CDS struggles to become more 
demand-driven (Benn / Rogerson / Steensen 2010). It has been disputed to such an extent, 
in fact, that independent CPA analysis chose to exclude TC altogether (Kharas 2008).  
Contributions to international discussions on how to promote effective ownership in 
development cooperation frequently emphasise the need for “demand-driven” cooperation. 
The use of the term “demand” in the specific context of support to capacity development 
raises the question as to whether there is a “market” for such support, and, if so, how it 
behaves. Several forms of market failure in relation to externally financed advisory 
services have been observed (Table 7).  
Table 7: Market failures in capacity development support 
Information 
asymmetry: selection 
A tendency to restrict selection of providers of expertise to those with a 
proven track record, creating high barriers for entry 
Information 
asymmetry: monitoring 
and enforcement 
Once consultants are employed, the incentives for performance weaken 
incentives for good performance. Developing-country clients have limited 
means to monitor performance and ensure compliance 
Imperfect competition Frequent oligopoly signals: only few firms offer services 
Global or Regional 
Public Goods 
National governments may have insufficient incentives to purchase advisory 
services in relation to regional and global public goods 
Weak  
demand-articulation 
Developing-country governments often unable to identify specific needs and 
articulate demand precisely 
Source: OPM (2003, 9–10) 
                                                            
23  Country Programmable Aid is defined as the portion of aid that each donor (bilateral or multilateral) 
can programme for each recipient country (Benn / Rogerson / Steensen 2010). 
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Recent studies detect two tentative trends that would have a potential towards creating a 
more functioning market: (1) the growth of developing-country domestic consultancy 
markets, and (2) online “marketplaces” that reduce the need for implementing agencies as 
CD intermediaries (Morris / Pryke 2011; Ubels 2010). However, many of the past market 
distortions remain, which is why developing countries express disappointment over 
continuing patterns of expertise provided by “Northern” agencies and companies, as 
expressed in the policy statements cited above. Although South-South cooperation is no 
different in terms of the development partner determining the source of the goods and 
services, most developing countries see this as being less of a problem (Johnson / 
Versailles / Martin 2008). 
The preference of development partners to work through national implementing agencies 
that, over several decades, have specialised in specific types of support can lead to a 
failure to respond to developing-country preferences for other forms of support. This 
tendency is also related to management costs. Innovative approaches by definition involve 
higher costs, which may prevent a barrier if agencies are pushed to ensure “value for 
money”. Some development partners may consider these additional costs worthwhile to 
ensure relevant and tailor-made support, as illustrated in Box 3. 
Box 3: Regional twinning to support capacity development in South Sudan 
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s Regional Capacity Enhancement Initiative has 
facilitated the secondment of almost 200 civil servants from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda to the 
government of South Sudan. With technical support from the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), these civil servants have “twinned” with South Sudanese civil servants in different ministries. 
The seconding countries retain the civil servants on the payroll, while Norway provides project 
management and operational costs.  
This approach to regional knowledge-exchange was deemed to provide a better socio-cultural fit and a 
more suitable professional match compared to the use of international consultants. Whereas the potential 
of this approach has been confirmed during implementation, implementation strategies have been found 
to be inadequate due to a combination of weaknesses in the twinning process itself and the project’s 
management. This included misinterpretations of the project on the part of the Sudanese government, e.g. 
fear among civil servants that the foreign civil servants would take over their jobs, as well as insufficient 
designated counterparts. On the project management side, the UNDP Project Management Unit frequently 
felt compelled to take management decisions for which the Ministry of Labour was formally responsible. 
This showed that the choice for particular management arrangements have important implications, both for 
costs and project effectiveness. Despite these and other project implementation weaknesses, the potential of 
the project was felt to be sufficiently strong enough to merit a second phase, starting in mid 2013.  
Source: Da Costa et al. (2013) 
4.4.3 Budgeting, procuring and managing capacity development support 
Decisions about procurement, recruitment and deployment should be a country 
responsibility. These decisions should be based on full access to information and lead to 
the recruitment of technical assistant who are unambiguously accountable to the host 
organisations they serve. Substantial involvement of developing-country authorities in the 
recruitment of experts helps to counter the “free good” perception. This allows for a 
genuine dialogue between the government and its external partner on whether the external 
support considered has the potential to facilitate change, or what alternatives could be 
envisaged. Developing countries are increasingly questioning current practices where their 
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involvement in decision-making over CDS is limited to the screening of the curriculum 
vitae of candidates. Countries instead argue that their involvement in the selection process 
should be as rigorous as for the appointment of their own permanent staff (Land 2007, 21; 
Land / Morgan 2008).  
Managing external support to capacity development through the government’s treasury 
and using its own procedures and systems for procurement increases its control over the 
budgeting, planning and use of the funds. The broader relevance of local procurement 
should not be underestimated, as public procurement amounts to more than 15 per cent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) world-wide, whereas in developing countries it can account 
for as much as 70 per cent of government expenditure (UNDP 2010). Calls for local 
ownership and local procurement of technical cooperation are most often made by 
developing countries that are highly dependent on external inputs and where such inputs 
strongly affect government capacity and accountability, whereas countries that do not 
strongly depend on ODA may show less concern (Knack 2013, 11). Countries not 
dependent on ODA tend to be more concrete and precise on what external inputs they 
might accept, which leads to identifying “niche technical assistance” projects, which are 
generally not managed through country systems in the formal sense (Cox et al. 2011, 11). 
Under those conditions, effective ownership still requires that the partner government and 
its development partner jointly establish terms of reference for the external inputs requested, 
that these and the financial volume they represent are fed into the national planning process, 
and that the partner government is fully involved in the recruitment, monitoring and 
evaluation process.  
Despite their commitments to increase the transparency of their ODA investments, 
development partners may prefer not to show disaggregated figures for capacity 
development projects, for instance to avoid having to reveal salary differences between 
international experts and domestic ones. It may also be motivated by different views over 
what constitutes a competitive salary, as shown in Box 4.  
Box 4: Transparency on CD funding: evidence from Indonesia 
In a review of advisers funded by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid), 
implementing partners noted that if government counterparts were aware of the general level of adviser 
salaries, this could create the opportunity for corrupt practices, whereby advisers are asked to pay bribes 
for obtaining positions or for positive performance reviews. Adding to security concerns in some parts of 
the country (e.g. during the Aceh conflict), the review noted that adviser costs may need to be aggregated 
to protect staff. 
The review further found that international adviser fee rates on the whole did not cause concern among 
Indonesian counterparts, who expect them to be as expensive as they are and thus seek to minimise their 
use. When it comes to national advisers, however, they frequently make direct comparisons to their own 
salaries. As the report summarises: “On one hand [government officials] are asking for lower national 
adviser salaries, while on the other AusAID is trying to ensure it pays fair market rates to competent and 
skilled national advisers.” 
Source: AusAid (2010b, 16–17) 
As an alternative to giving developing countries direct control over funding, some 
development put in place specific “pools” or trust funds for CDS. Pooled and trust funds 
tend to share similar features, such as an oversight committee and a mandate for joint 
programming. The management of trust funds is typically “entrusted” to an independent 
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organisation, as a rule the World Bank or UNDP, whereas pooled funds are operated by 
developing countries and/or their development partners. Whereas trust funds generally 
follow the administrators’ management and procurement systems, pooled funds allow more 
flexibility and possibilities to position management closer to government structures (Hugh / 
Glassman / Gwenigale 2011, 9). Box 5 presents some findings from past studies on such 
pooled TC funds:  
Box 5: Experiences in technical cooperation pools 
Studies frequently distinguish between three levels of TC pooling (Hauck / Baser 2005, 2): 
• Full pooling: Here most resources and control are with the national participants, who both contract 
and manage the technical assistance. 
• Mixed pooling: Here the national authorities manage the technical assistance, but the contracting is 
done by one of the development partners. 
• Loose pooling: Here the management of the technical assistants is shared between the government and 
its development partners. This option leads to individual contracting, which can be tied in many cases.  
Although these three levels have featured in other publications, it has been argued that they cannot be 
strictly distinguished from other forms of coordination, and that it would be better to use the following 
definitions as a standard criterion: “a TA pool exists wherever technical cooperation resources are jointly 
managed by a partner and two or more donors. These actors pool resources for a jointly agreed purpose 
and take joint decisions on their use (through procedures, work programmes etc. or joint decision-making 
committees)” (Körner / Bürcky / Forster 2009, 5–6).  
The different approaches to pooling can be given shape through a strong integration with developing-
country government systems, or be managed relatively independently from such systems. A review of 
such pools that were in existence in 2005 concluded that while many arrangements have the ambition of 
doing full pooling, they are in practice loose in nature, with the main observed reason being weak national 
management capacity. They also found that where it works, the TA pool is part of something bigger (e.g. 
a sector-wide approach – SWAp) and is government-coordinated. When too many development partners 
are active in a sector (the report cites examples of more than 20 being active in one sector), and when a 
developing-country government is not in a position to fully coordinate, then rationalising as opposed to 
pooling would be a better strategy. Finally, successful pools require substantial levels of trust to function, 
most of all between the development partners taking part (Hauck / Baser 2005).  
4.4.4 Evaluation and auditing of capacity development support 
Another neglected aspect of the discussion on the use of country systems is the extent to 
which efforts are made to monitor and evaluate the CDS, as well as what role developing-
country stakeholders play therein. A joint evaluation that evaluated technical assistance in 
support of PFM in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali encountered many cases in which 
anticipated outputs and outcomes of technical assistance projects were not clearly stated. 
In addition, many technical assistance projects do not produce any progress reports, which 
is sometimes linked to a lack of clarity about what they should report on in the first place 
(Lawson 2012).  
Further efforts to improve the “evaluability” of the CDS provided is therefore needed at 
the design phase of the intervention concerned, and opportunities can be used to ensure the 
involvement of involved government departments as well as developing-country 
evaluators in strengthening monitoring and evaluation practices. This can, in turn, 
contribute to more effective external support (Keijzer 2013; Jones 2013). 
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International discussions have also clarified that development cooperation is “on audit” 
when it is audited by country auditing institutions in accordance with country legal 
frameworks and procedures and carried out by the country’s supreme audit institution. 
Development partners may do so, but they can also require specific audits of their 
interventions (Sprietzer / Vargas 2011, 8). As it is generally delivered in the form of 
relatively small projects, little is known on the extent to which CDS is externally audited 
by developing-country institutions. 
Having looked into the general research evidence on how support to capacity 
development is drawn up, prepared, delivered and evaluated, the next section of this 
paper examines to what extent four developing countries can and do manage the external 
support available to them.  
5 Country evidence on applying aid- and development-effectiveness  
principles to support capacity development 
5.1 A framework for analysing instruments to support capacity development  
at the country level 
In order to provide a reliable basis to identify areas for further research, the first 
consideration made was how to select countries that would be representative of larger 
groups of countries and thus could produce findings of relevance to different contexts. 
One way is by defining groupings of countries, such as through distinguishing groups 
based on levels of capacity and ownership (Figure 2): 
Figure 2: A typology of ownership and capacity in developing countries 
 
Source: Figure reproduced from Hauck and Land (2011, 4) 
A consequence of the relational nature of development cooperation is that a similar 
analysis should also be made of developing partners active in the countries concerned. In 
this context, a recent study suggests to redefine and operationalise the concept of 
“absorptive capacity” by proposing that absorptive capacity exists only in relation to 
Ownership
Capacity
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specific interventions. As per this definition, improvements to absorptive capacity can be 
made by positive changes in the capabilities of recipients, in the capabilities of 
development partners, as well as through the design and key parameters of the 
intervention itself (Lamb 2013, 1).  
A joint-evaluation of support to local development identified reflected this in a typology 
of four types of partnership based on the capacities of both developing countries and their 
development partners (Beaulieu / LeBlanc 2006, 7): 
• Emergent partnership: A partnership where the definition of the working agenda 
and the relations process are in the initial stages. 
• Donor-push partnership: A partnership characterised by a relatively strong presence 
and leadership on the part of the development-partner network. 
• Recipient-pull partnership: A partnership in which a strong local capacity for ODA 
management and leadership is deployed to influence the aid relationship. 
• Mature partnership: A partnership where relations are well developed and where 
partnership processes and agendas are effective, efficient and sustainable in the long term.  
The second consideration in selecting countries was the availability of substantial recent 
evaluations and studies, notably the first and second phases of the Paris Declaration 
evaluation as well as the 2006, 2008 and 2011 monitoring surveys. This presents a bias in 
the sense that one can assume that a country’s participation in the evaluation and surveys 
indicates a strong commitment, but such a purposeful sample was opportune in view of the 
“scoping” nature of this paper. 
It was chosen to complement the general analysis of how the countries manage the support 
to capacity development with an analysis of the support provided in a specific sector. For 
this purpose, the health sector is relevant for two reasons. First of all, this sector was 
addressed in all country evaluations conducted for the second phase of the Paris 
Declaration evaluation. Second, the sector is known to attract substantial development 
contributions, which create opportunities to increase health results but also capacity 
development challenges discussed in this paper, such as the bypassing of country systems 
and the creation of parallel delivery systems.  
Based on the analysis of the general literature and research evidence presented above, the 
following key questions were formulated to guide the analysis: 
• To what extent do the countries show differences in the quality of their country 
systems, and what does available quantitative evidence show as to how this affects 
support received from international development partners? (Section 5.2) 
• How do developing-country governments make efforts to manage external CDS? 
(Section 5.3) 
• What general impressions of the effectiveness of CDS emerge from the Paris 
Declaration evaluation country reports and other research evidence? (Section 5.3) 
• What are specific approaches to managing CDS in the health sector? (Section 5.4) 
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5.2 Country selection and overall characteristics 
The following four countries were selected and categorised alongside the four different 
types of partnerships (Table 8). By making this choice, the results of the analysis will be 
most relevant for low-income countries that receive substantial external support as well as 
that recently “graduated” from this group (such as Vietnam). Nepal was included to gain 
insights from a fragile state that has challenged its development partners to increase the 
use of their systems.  
Table 8: Country case study selection 
 Mozambique Nepal Rwanda Vietnam 
Emergent partnership  X   
Donor-push partnership X    
Recipient-pull partnership   X  
Mature partnership    X 
Source: Own elaboration, using categories defined by Beaulieu and LeBlanc (2006, 7) 
Apart from Rwanda, all countries were covered by the second phase of the Paris 
Declaration evaluation,24 whereas Rwanda has been subject to various other independent 
studies on aid effectiveness. A recent independent meta-evaluation of the quality of 15 
Paris Declaration country evaluation reports signalled that the quality level of some 
reports made their inclusion in the synthesis report questionable (Songco / Holvoet / 
Inberg 2012). The following table summarises strengths and weaknesses of the reports, as 
identified by the authors for the three countries analysed here (Table 9): 
Table 9: Strong and weak points of Paris Declaration country evaluation reports 
 Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Mozambique Workshop to discuss findings Members of evaluation team not mentioned, limited access to respondents 
Nepal Cross validation of analysis, excellent quality of analysis, workshop  
Government bias by including two 
government officials in evaluation team 
Vietnam Cross validation of analysis, excellent quality of analysis 
No list of interviews, no information on 
quality control, lack of time available 
Source: Songco / Holvoet / Inberg (2012) 
In terms of overall development cooperation statistics, the countries fall into two 
categories: on the one hand the least-developed countries Mozambique, Rwanda and 
Nepal, all with high ODA to gross national income (GNI) ratios and strong aid 
fragmentation, and on the other hand middle-income country Vietnam with low ODA 
dependence and low fragmentation.25 On selected Paris Declaration indicators, however, 
the countries show significant differences (Table 10): 
                                                            
24  Mozambique was also included in the joint evaluation’s first phase, which was concluded in 2008.  
25  There are many providers of development cooperation in Vietnam, but the bulk of the ODA is provided 
by a limited number of development partners.  
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Table 10: Selected country statistics on development and aid effectiveness 
2009 data (USD) Mozambique Nepal Rwanda Vietnam 
GNI per capita 440 440 490 1000 
Net ODA  2 billion 855 million 934 million 4.165 billion 
ODA as % GNI 22% 22% 20% 3% 
% ODA  
by top 5 partners 47% 62% 58% 82% 
ODA  
as % of budget 
Reported as 
“declining” 
34% of central 
gov. expenditure No info 
Reported as 
“minimal” 
Indicator 5  
(% of aid using 
country systems) 
47% 62% 50% 62% 
Indicator 4 
(coordinated TC)  28% 48% 92% 59% 
Source: 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration 
The 2006 Paris Declaration evaluation survey observed that indicators 4 and 5 were 
both difficult to monitor. In the case of coordinated technical assistance, the indicator 
was interpreted rather liberally in many countries: only the TC that was not agreed 
with the government was considered uncoordinated. As for the monitoring data on the 
use of country systems, the authors caution the reader that, as a result of the 
interpretations made of the measurement, the numbers somewhat overstate the 
effective use of country systems (OECD 2006, 23–24). These choices limit the ability 
of the indicators to inform judgement on the extent to which the agreed policy 
commitments are translated into practice. 
But were the systems of the four countries “ready” for support to begin with, and how was 
this judged? In its March 2013 meeting, the Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation endorsed the CPIA as the means to monitor the quality of country systems – 
the same index as was used by the Paris Declaration monitoring framework.26 In relation 
to the indicator “quality of country PFM systems”, a target is presented whereby 
developing-country governments commit to ensure a 0.5 increase of their CPIA scores in 
the period 2010–2015.  
On the side of the providers of development cooperation, a commitment is made to 
“reduce the gap” in using developing-country PFM and procurement systems by half 
for countries with CPIA scores above 5, and by one-third for countries with lower 
scores. This effectively means that development partners only commit to a one-third 
gap reduction, since only Georgia and Armenia might have a chance of scoring over 5 
in CPIA during the 2010–2015 period.27 The 2011 Paris Declaration survey found that 
48 per cent of aid in support of the public sector uses country PFM systems and 44 per 
cent uses public procurement systems. Therefore, reducing the gap by one-third would, 
                                                            
26  See: http://effectivecooperation.org/files/about-trackingprogress/INDICATORS.pdf (accessed 30 
Jul. 2013). 
27  See: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.ECON.XQ (accessed 27 May 2013). 
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in practice, imply that by 2015, development partners will have increased the 
percentage of their support to the public sector through PFM systems by 17.3 per cent, 
compared to the 2010 situation, and increased their use of local public procurement by 
18.7 per cent.  
These overall projections, however, are not very reliable, given the lack of sufficient 
country data to define a 2010 baseline for this target (OECD 2011). Moreover, only a 
few countries will show a situation similar to the average scores, as the situation tends 
to be very different from one country to the next. For instance, the 2011 Paris 
Declaration survey noted that scores in using PFM ranged from 0 per cent in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo to 77 per cent in the case of Bangladesh (OECD 2011). 
This also implies that by committing to a one-third gap reduction in using PFM and 
local procurement, development partners’ responses will range from minor tinkering to 
complete revolution.  
As for the 0.5 CPIA increase that developing countries committed to, the availability of 
figures allows for examining the likelihood of the four countries studied realising such an 
increase over a five-year period. Figure 3 shows the CPIA scores achieved by the 
countries in the period 2005–2011: 
Figure 3: CPIA trends for Vietnam, Rwanda, Mozambique, Nepal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank CPIA data 
These CPIA trends can, in turn, be compared with other measures of country systems in 
the four countries, namely the available PEFA scores, the Open Budget Index, Paris 
Declaration monitoring data and corruption indices. Table 11 presents the available data 
for the four countries.  
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Table 11: Country system quality indicators for the four countries 
 MOZ NPL RWA VNM 
CPIA score 2011 3.61 3.31 3.81 3.75 
Increase CPIA score 2005–2010 0.26 -0.01 0.37 0.06 
% increase CPIA score 2005 -> 2011 5.7% 0.3% 9.9% 0.6% 
OBI overall rating 47/100 44/100 8/100 19/100 
Most recent PEFA average (year)28 2.88 (2010) 
2.25 
(2005) 
2.96 
(2010) N/A 
% increase PEFA score compared to earlier measurement (year) 17.5% (2006) N/A 
23.88% 
(2007) N/A 
PEFA score: aid managed through national procedures (year) 2 (2010) 
1 
(2005) 
1 
(2010) N/A 
% of aid using country PFM systems (PD survey 2005) 38% 68% (2007) 46% 33% 
% of aid using country PFM systems (PD survey 2010) 47% 62% 57% 40% 
Evolution PD country PFM systems score (survey 2005–2010) +9% -8% +11% +7% 
% of aid using country procurement systems (PD survey 2005) 38% 56% (2007) 46% 33% 
% of aid using country procurement systems (PD survey 2010) 56% 35% 64% 66% 
Evolution PD country procurement systems score  
(survey 2005–2010) +18 -11% +20% +33% 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 
(rank out of 173 countries/score) 123/31 139/27 50/53 123/31 
World Bank Control of Corruption Index – estimate of 
governance 2011 (range: -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) ) -0.41 -0.77 0.45 -0.59 
Source: Own compilation using World Bank, PEFA and OBI data  
A number of observations can be drawn from this table. The figures first of all show 
that, given the trend in CPIA scores for Mozambique, Nepal and Rwanda in the 2005–
2010 period, the 0.5 CPIA increase target for 2010–2015 may only be (remotely) 
realistic for Rwanda – which in that case would still have to seriously increase 
performance.  
Secondly, the country with the largest increase in CPIA scores, Rwanda, scores lowest 
of all four countries in the Open Budget Index, which focuses on the transparency of 
country systems. Another observation is that the multi-annual PEFA scores for 
Mozambique and Rwanda both indicate a degree of progress that is more than twice 
                                                            
28  The analysis of PEFA scores was done on the basis of publicly available assessment reports that 
were accessed from http://www.pefa.org (accessed 3 Apr. 2013). The average scores were produced 
using the same approach to transposing the A-D scoring into a numerical scale as was used by De 
Renzio (2009).  
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the increase in CPIA scores under the same period. This illustrates the differences in 
emphasis between the indices used and the different measurements this creates.  
With the exception of Vietnam on PFM systems and Nepal on procurement, all 
countries scored above the 2010 Paris Declaration targets (and therefore above 
average). In strong contrast to these scores, the PEFA indicator for aid management 
through national systems registered the lowest possible score for Rwanda and Nepal 
and a slightly higher score for Mozambique in 2010 (which had a minimal score in 
2005 and 2010). As studies suggest that perceptions of fiduciary risk are important in 
guiding development partners’ use of country procurement systems, the low usage of 
country systems in Rwanda is peculiar as it contrasts with the country’s absolute and 
relative high performance on the corruption index.29 
5.3 Approaches to the management of capacity development support in the four 
countries 
A study on alternative approaches to managing technical assistance distinguished between 
six elements that can be used by developing countries to manage technical assistance. 
Based on a review of the Paris Declaration evaluation country reports, other studies and 
documents published by the governments of the four countries, Table 12 compares the 
countries’ coverage of the six elements.  
Table 12: Overall approaches to managing capacity development support30 
Limited 
capacity / 
failed states 
Articulation 
of 
development 
priorities 
Country-led 
identification 
of TA needs 
Integration of 
TA into 
national 
budget 
Procurement 
of TA by 
recipient 
country 
Graduation 
from aid / 
domestic TA 
industry 
n.a. MOZ, NPL, RWA, VNM VNM, (RWA) RWA, (NPL) RWA, (VNM) VNM 
Source: Own elaboration in relation to dimensions defined in OPM (2003, 27) 
The different approaches and key steps made to manage support to capacity development, 
as well as evidence on the effectiveness of external support, are discussed for each of the 
four countries in turn.  
5.3.1 Mozambique 
Mozambique attracted high levels of development finance following the end of a 
devastating war in 1992, and in the process became both a model and “laboratory” for the 
use of innovative approaches such as budget support and pooled funding. In the past two 
decades, the government has deliberately chosen not to pursue a strong national project of 
its own, but instead has shown a strong willingness to follow policies proposed by 
                                                            
29  The Corruption Perceptions Index shows that Rwanda outperforms several EU member states.  
30  Countries mentioned between brackets indicate that some progress has been made to implementing this 
approach, or that the approach is used on a smaller scale.  
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development partners in exchange for development finance. Combined with the 
fragmented approaches to development cooperation and the above-average number of 
cooperation partners, a system emerged that is hard to keep an overview of, let alone steer 
in a purposeful manner (De Renzio / Hanlon 2009, 246; Vollmer 2013).31  
Although the country experienced a large inflow of development finance provided 
through modalities such as budget support, an estimated two-thirds of development 
cooperation in Mozambique is not delivered through country systems and is channelled 
directly to developing-country stakeholders using project instruments. Ever since 
independence in 1975, the country has strongly relied on skilled foreigners, while during 
the 1990s structural adjustment programmes required government to cut civil service 
salaries by more than 50 per cent. This led to a proliferation of projects and 
accompanying TC, while the declining salaries stimulated civil servants and ex-civil 
servants to work in development-partner-financed projects at the expense of government 
capacity. As a result, in 2007 the amount of TC provided was estimated at roughly half 
of the public sector wage bill (Hauck / Souto 2007). 
The government lacks a common understanding of technical assistance, and there is no 
strategy, policy or guidelines on how to work with TC. This raises questions about the 
government’s commitment to demand-driven capacity development (KPMG 2010; Hauck 
/ Souto 2007). Individual development partners generally acknowledge that TC projects 
are a joint responsibility between themselves and the government, not one to be shared or 
coordinated with other development partners. Much of the management of in-kind TC has 
been led by development-partner headquarters in a way that leaves the government little 
say in the selection process (Hauck / Souto 2007).  
In the past few years the government has made no progress in formulating an overall 
vision on and demand for CDS, with its 2011 PRSP only making generic references to the 
need to “build the capacity” of particular sectors under the government’s implementation 
plan – without specifying in what areas it would particularly require external inputs 
(Republic of Mozambique 2011). An analysis of the Mozambican political economy 
further indicates that in recent years the state has increasingly turned into an executive 
branch of the party and that presidential authority has been asserted to the detriment of 
lower and mid-level institutions. However, the strong potential in extractive resources has 
led to a steady increase in interest among foreign investors (De Tollenaere 2012). These 
trends signal negative implications for effective management of support to capacity 
development.  
5.3.2 Nepal 
In Nepal, the transition from more than 200 years of hereditary and autocratic rule to a 
democratic government in 1990 led to a Maoist insurgency, which, in 2006, evolved into a 
politically unstable situation with frequent changes in government. This has resulted in 
                                                            
31  The government has put in place an online database (http://www.odamoz.org.mz/, visited 31 July 
2013), yet this only covers OECD partners, while Mozambique attracts substantial non-OECD 
assistance (Vollmer 2013). 
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low levels of foreign investment, while development partners have preferred to manage 
their own projects over channelling support via the government. As a result of dependence 
on ODA, government policies have been influenced to a significant extent by the 
government’s development partners. In addition to ODA, the country receives substantial 
assistance from India and China in the form of TC and infrastructure development, which 
is mainly motivated by commercial and security interests and is fully tied to Indian and 
Chinese contractors (ERD 2013; Pandey / Adhikari / Sijapati 2013, 1).  
The evaluation of the Paris Declaration estimated that, in 2008, a total of 34 per cent of 
development cooperation was provided as TA for capacity development. Institutions are 
perceived as weak, which development partners use to justify their decisions not to use 
country systems. However, the evaluators, which included government officials, felt that 
the same TA support had been provided for 30 to 40 years and did not deliver. They thus 
concluded that there is “too much TA with more doing for and less doing with.” The 
dominant approach to CDS is the use of expatriate expertise that largely focuses on 
delivering technical outputs through training-based interventions, as opposed to support 
aimed at facilitating institutional capacity development (MinFin 2010, 43–44).32 The 
evaluation stated examples of project-supported capacity development results, as well as 
general progress in the contribution of development partners to capacity development. At 
the same time, the evaluation could not identify any coherent and comprehensive 
assessment of capacity development needs. Support provided is instead largely identified 
by development partners in dialogue with individual ministries and government agencies 
(MinFin 2010, 43–44).  
Nepal’s Ministry of Finance is tasked with overall coordination and management of 
foreign aid. Following the end of the civil war, the government set out to revise its policy 
on foreign aid, which was originally adopted in 2002. Among the objectives that the 
government set in a draft of the new policy was “enhance the nation’s capability to 
envision, implement and sustain development programs through knowledge and 
technology transfer in order to accelerate production and productivity of the economy” 
(MinFin 2008, 4). The draft policy document observed that TA has fallen short of the 
contribution that it could have made, mainly due to the excessive reliance on foreign 
expertise.33 By not making optimal use of available national expertise, the support 
provided has resulted in the adoption of inappropriate technology, while also adding to the 
country’s debt burden in cases when the TA was provided as a loan (MinFin 2008, 4). 
The government has also invested in an online Aid Management Platform (AMP), which 
the government views to have increased the transparency and availability of information 
about development cooperation. Data from the AMP, which covers both ODA and South-
South cooperation partners, show that during the financial year 2011/2012, a total of 269 
TA projects were provided, representing a total volume of US$ 159.5 million, or 15 per 
                                                            
32  A Strategic Conflict Assessment commissioned by the United Kingdom observed that persisting 
poverty in Nepal was not due to a lack of state capacity, but to the excluding nature of the political 
settlement. It argued that building state capacity would perpetuate the political settlement (ERD 2013).  
33  Although the 2008 revision was not formally adopted, media reports from 2013 indicated that the 
government had again set out to revise the policy, which should lead to further coordination of 
development partners and promote the use of country systems. See http://www.spotlightnepal.com/ 
News/Article/Taming-Donors and http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2013/03/03/ 
related_articles/panel-to-revise-foreign-aid-policy/245942.html (both accessed 7 May 2013).  
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cent of total assistance. The report also notes that TA is more fragmented and provided 
less through country systems compared to other forms of development cooperation 
(MinFin 2013a).  
Aided by the information gathered through the AMP, the Ministry of Finance publishes a 
separate Statement of Technical and Other Assistance, which it submits to parliament on 
an annual basis, together with the budget speech, and covers both projects targeted at the 
government and those implemented through international non-governmental 
organisations. The most recent report covering financial year 2013/2014 presents such 
projects per government department, including from non-OECD members such as India 
and China. Although the information is restricted to the project title, its planned duration, 
a handful of words describing activities and an overall financial value (which in some 
cases is marked “N/A”), it represents an important example of a developing country 
making special efforts to inform its parliament and the general public of capacity 
development investments. However, it states that the report excludes technical assistance 
that is not expressed in monetary terms (MinFin 2013b). 
5.3.3 Rwanda 
Rwanda has made strong development progress over the past 12 years. Although 
remaining strongly dependent on external development finance, it has sought to ensure 
stability, social organisation and economic diversification. Trends point to a gradual 
reduction in Rwanda’s dependence on ODA (ERD 2013; Abbott / Malunda / Festo 
2013).34 Large amounts of TC have been provided in the years following the genocide, 
including consultants who worked in many core functions of government (Hayman 2009).  
The government of Rwanda has made strong investments in managing development 
cooperation, for which the basis is provided by a formal aid policy that was adopted in 
2006. Although development partners were widely consulted and provided technical 
support to assist its formulation, the policy is widely considered as being owned by 
government (Hayman 2009). The policy clarifies how and in what ways government 
prefers to manage the external assistance as a means to further its Economic Development 
and Poverty Reduction Strategy, and includes explicit objectives in relation to CDS. The 
government has also put in place an online database to centralise and make available 
information on the assistance provided by development partners. On the basis of the aid 
policy, a more detailed Rwanda Aid Policy Manual of Procedures has been prepared to 
further operationalise this policy (GoR 2012). The manual will be relatively specific on 
how the government wants to manage external support to capacity as delivered by external 
partners (Box 6).  
Box 6: Key aspects of Rwanda’s Aid Policy Manual of Procedures with regard to technical assistance 
• The end-user of the TA is to make sure proposed TA is consistent with capacity needs in its sector / 
district plans. 
• PSCBS supported by MINECOFIN to assess TA proposals fit with national capacity / skills needs-
                                                            
34 The country for instance recently launched its first international sovereign bond. See: 
http://www.minecofin.gov.rw (accessed 7 May 2013). 
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assessments. 
• ToRs for TA to be developed by the government agency, which should include clear benchmarks / 
progress indicators. 
• Government agency implementing TA, PSCBS and MINECOFIN to negotiate on how to identify 
and manage service provider that will deliver the TA. 
• Preference for use of Capacity Building Fund to ensure support provided in context of Strategic 
Capacity Building Initiatives. 
Source: GoR (2012) 
To further some of these aims, a Presidential Order in August 2009 established the 
government’s Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat (PSCBS). A key task for the 
Secretariat is the management of the Capacity Building Fund (CBF), which government 
created to “finance strategic capacity building activities in a coordinated, transparent and 
efficient manner” (PSCBS 2011, 5). The government considers that the advantage of the 
fund is that it creates oversight of the wide range of public sector capacity-development 
interventions and can thus increase their impact. Besides managing the fund, the CBF 
Secretariat also provides management support and services to TA funds managed at the 
sector level (PSCBS 2011, 5). Given the government’s preference to pool project funds, 
there are, however, multiple pooled, basket and trust funds in different sectors, many of 
which have existed longer than the CBF and include their own capacity development 
components. As a result, the CBF is still modest in size (Abbott / Rwirahira 2012). 
Complementary to the use of these pooled funds, government started a pilot in December 
2011 with the use of a Treasury Single Account, which allows for greater alignment of the 
development projects and the TC components they include (Shyaka / Rwamuganza / 
Schaeffer 2012). 
Despite the strong policy thrust and clear priorities on how government prefers to manage 
and use technical assistance, independent reports on the implementation of the aid- and 
development-effectiveness agenda in Rwanda refer to continued practices of donor-driven 
technical assistance. The government’s own aid-effectiveness report notes that TA is not 
as coordinated as development partners claim it to be, thus questioning the statistics 
recorded by the Paris Declaration survey (Abbott / Rwirahira 2012).35  
Some development partners who do not adhere to the government’s policy on support to 
capacity development may privately legitimise their actions in reference to the refusal of 
non-OECD development partners to report to act in accordance with the government’s aid 
policy. Although South-South cooperation partners experience TA to be less costly than 
TA from OECD development partners, it is not necessarily more country-owned or 
managed and can cause problems for local procurement (Abbott / Rwirahira 2012; Abbott 
/ Malunda / Festo 2013). In a speech delivered during the Busan High-Level Forum, the 
President of Rwanda expressed disappointment over the low use of country systems by 
development partners and emphasised the need to shift the cooperation regime beyond 
“traditional donors” (Kagame 2011).  
                                                            
35  An example of how TA is recruited by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) is given in 
Abbott et al. (2011, 36).  
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5.3.4 Vietnam 
Vietnam has a relatively strong enabling environment for successfully managing external 
support. The country has spent more than two decades in overhauling its former planned 
economy and, in the process, has attracted substantial support from the international 
community. Although ODA has represented only between 3 and 4 per cent of GDP over 
the past few years, it nonetheless supported 15–17 per cent of the public investment and is 
considered an important source of finance (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). The 
country manages development cooperation by means of well-established mechanisms for 
managing development cooperation, which are guided by a modified version of the Paris 
Declaration, termed the “Hanoi Core Statement”, which it agreed with international 
partners in 2005. The government also formulated the Strategic Framework for ODA 
Mobilisation and Utilisation for the period 2006–2010, which identified five key areas 
where government welcomed TA (Watson / Minh Tongh / Zinke 2007). The new Strategic 
Framework for 2011–2020 relates to the country’s Socio-Economic Development Strategy 
and the country’s own development goals for the same period, which give priority to 
developing the country’s human, technological and scientific capacity (Communist Party 
of Vietnam Central Committee 2010).  
In contrast to the socio-economic changes, political changes have been far less rapid, as 
the Communist Party of Vietnam continues to be the sole political authority, and elected 
members of both central and decentralised authorities face constraints in performing their 
representative roles (Cox et al. 2011; Watson / Minh Tongh / Zinke 2007). The 
conservative administrative culture and high levels of corruption present challenges to 
external support to capacity development in general, and technical assistance in particular. 
Positive factors influencing the use of TA include the educational levels of key officials as 
well as their increased international exposure. Another aspect is that language barriers still 
necessitate that technical assistants work closely with local counterparts, which helps to 
facilitate learning (Cox et al. 2011; Watson / Minh Tongh / Zinke 2007).  
Vietnam’s development cooperation profile is evolving as a result of the achievement of 
middle-income country status in 2010, which has led to development partners changing 
the nature of their assistance by either phasing out assistance or changing to increased 
concessional loans (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). This is shown by a 
transition from “traditional” support to sectors to specific and targeted technical 
assistance in “niche” areas. This does not follow the formal approaches to planning 
assumed in the Paris Declaration, but typically is made via direct requests to 
development partners, informed by government’s own appreciation of their added value. 
Despite these changes, it is observed that the government is not yet sufficiently able to 
diagnose its own needs and further optimise its use of external TA (Cox et al. 2011). The 
general picture is that government officials are sceptical about capacity-building projects 
when these involve foreign technical assistants. TA is moreover considered the most 
fragmented part of the aid portfolio, while public officials feel that no useable definition 
of coordinated technical assistance has emerged. At the same time, the government’s 
strategies do not give much attention to capacity issues, which could be a basis for more 
such coordinated approaches (Cox et al. 2011). 
Partly as a result of not having to strongly rely on external development finance, the 
government is reluctant to open up its “country systems” to external partners. The 
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government prefers the use of the project modality due to having more experience and 
familiarity with managing it, the additional financial incentives that Project 
Implementation Units (PIUs) bring, but also due to the lack of clear government guidance 
on using other modalities. PIUs, however, bring disadvantages, such as the need for some 
PIUs to produce separate reports, or confusing situations due to the simultaneous use of 
using development-partner and government procurement rules. Moreover, development 
partners continue to offer financial incentives to government officials to enable project 
implementation (Cox et al. 2011; Watson / Minh Tongh / Zinke 2007).  
5.4 Capacity development in the health sector 
In the past decades, health has become an increasingly important focus for development 
cooperation, with overall support growing from US$ 5.82 billion in 1990 to US$ 27.73 
billion in 2011 (Álvarez / Acharya 2012). This increase has been accompanied by a 
proliferation of bilateral, multilateral, civilateral and private cooperation partners. Support 
is often provided in erratic and unpredictable ways and is lopsided to specific aspects of 
developing countries’ health budgets. The support presents strong direct and indirect costs 
to the health system of developing countries, and affects its capacity at different levels in 
both positive and negative ways (Álvarez / Acharya 2012; Dodd / Hill 2007).  
The report of the OECD/DAC’s Task Team on Health as a Tracer Sector found that 
development-partner commitment to using country systems in providing external support 
to the health sector has increased “on paper” but has not been translated sufficiently into 
action. The report concludes that although evidence is limited, individual country 
experiences suggest that development partners continue to provide technical assistance on 
a bilateral basis. Several challenges contribute to this, including a lack of national TA 
plans, weak national ownership and capacity to manage TA, and continued provision of 
short-term bilateral technical assistance (OECD 2012). These overall findings are 
contrasted in the sections below with the findings of the Paris Declaration evaluation and 
other relevant studies for Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda and Vietnam.  
5.4.1 Mozambique 
Linked to a sector strategy adopted in 2001, the health ministry established the 
PROSAUDE Health Common Fund in November 2003, to which development partners 
currently contribute 22 per cent of total external funding to the sector. Other development 
partners cite the need to earmark funding for specific activities. The sector-wide approach 
is appreciated, yet the large number of development partners proved to be too many in 
number to be coordinated, and their management largely distracted the ministry from its 
core policy tasks (OECD 2012). This is not only due to the number of development 
partners: the ministry experiences a high turnover of staff and often accepts to outsourcing 
of tasks to development partners, tasks that should be the responsibility of the government 
(Koenig / Goodwin 2011). 
Efforts to promote coordination between development partners active in the sector go back 
to the first post-conflict years. In 2000 a sector-specific code of conduct was adopted (and 
revised in 2003) before being superseded by the international aid-effectiveness agendas. A 
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few years earlier, in 1996, the Pooling Arrangement for Technical Assistance was an early 
attempt at harmonising support. This fund was managed by the ministry, administered by 
the UNDP and funded by the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland. However, it ceased 
operations a few years later, among other reasons due to communications between the 
development partners and the ministry, lack of consensus among development partners 
(some of whom wanted a broader “sector-wide approach”) and the inadequate 
involvement of the planning and finance ministry (Pavignani / Hauck 2002).  
The Paris Declaration evaluation’s country report on Mozambique observes that the health 
ministry has a clear idea of which areas it is interested in having TA (e.g. financial 
management) and where it is reluctant to receive TA (e.g. clinical matters). This has, on 
occasion, led to disagreements between the ministry and its development partners (KPMG 
2010). In 2007 the new minister for health decided to phase out the substantial number of 
technical assistants who were occupying line posts (i.e. “doing the work”). Although there 
is currently no specific, approved capacity-building strategy or common fund for the 
health sector, the ministry presented an ambitious human resources plan in 2008. By 2010, 
however, no common position among development partners had emerged. Pooling of 
technical assistance was again put on the agenda around that time, but it was abandoned 
because the process of developing joint terms of reference was very time-consuming 
(Visser-Valfrey / Umarji 2010).  
5.4.2 Nepal 
In Nepal, the Paris Declaration evaluation observed impressive results in improved 
harmonisation and alignment in the health sector, although at the same time it was 
observed that much remains to be done (MinFin 2010). One key capacity issue concerns 
the low level of service provision in rural areas, which reflects the undermining of formal 
rules by other factors, including deeply embedded cultural norms, political competition, 
the structure of the labour market and the role of external actors. (Harris et al. 2013). 
Leadership deficiencies of government in the health sector have been linked to the 
supplementing of government capacity in service delivery by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and other development partners (MinFin 2010).  
The development and adoption of a SWAp with strong support from development partners 
enabled further coordination, although only two development partners joined a pool that 
would allow for further use of country systems. Continued parallel support from many 
other development partners as well as global programmes has resulted in fragmentation 
and hampered institutional integration. For the second phase of the SWAp, a third 
development partner has joined, while the GAVI alliance is channelling capacity-building 
support through the SWAp. Despite efforts towards coordinated support, issues of poor 
sector governance, excessive TA and weak capacity remain (MinFin 2010).  
5.4.3 Rwanda 
The Rwandan health sector receives more ODA than any other government sector, which 
is partly because government has achieved impressive health outcomes and made strong 
efforts at managing external support (Abbott / Malunda / Festo 2013). An external 
Unfinished agenda or overtaken by events? 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 49 
evaluation of the first Health Sector Strategic Plan I 2005–2009 highlighted health 
improvements between 2005 and 2007 and observed that Rwanda scored above the 
African regional average for most health-related MDG indicators. However, the sector 
depends on ODA from 17 different partners for 60 per cent of its financing. This has 
contributed to inconsistent and overlapping health-system-strengthening initiatives as well 
as considerable earmarking (Holvoet / Inberg 2012; Dodd / Hill 2007). A recent 
assessment by the government observes that half of the external support is provided by the 
US government, while more than half of all external support addresses only three diseases. 
It notes the high degree of fragmentation and projectisation occurring, despite a perceived 
strong leadership of the Ministry of Health (MINECOFIN 2012).  
In 2007 the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding launched a SWAp in the sector, 
with the government and development-partner signatories expressing full support for 
applying the international aid-effectiveness agenda in the sector. Technical Working 
Groups were set up to address particular technical issues and priorities of the sector plan. 
Despite these actions – and in contrast to the also highly externally funded education 
sector – the majority of ODA to the health sector is delivered through projects (Holvoet / 
Inberg 2012). As a result, a large portion of external finance remains off budget. The 
establishment of a Single Project Implementation Unit and the use of Joint Financing 
Modalities may alleviate some of the problems (IHP+ 2012). 
In 2011 the government adopted a Human Resources for Health strategy for the period 
2011–2016. The strategy’s situation analysis points to capacity constraints in the national 
training institutes as well as in the recruitment and retention of health workers. In line with 
the overall health system strategy, the strategic plan seeks to guarantee “availability of 
appropriate numbers and combinations of qualified health personnel at all levels of the 
health system” (Ministry of Health 2011, 7). According to the Development Assistance 
Database, 49.1 per cent of disbursements in the health sector in 2010/2011 was spent on 
TA, much of which is spent through NGOs (MINECOFIN 2012). A recent joint health 
review highlights that a separate TA plan will be developed in relation to the health 
strategic plan, which may address some of these challenges (IHP+ 2012).  
5.4.4 Vietnam 
The Paris Declaration evaluation’s Vietnam report further observes that the overall 
picture of external support to the health sector is a challenging one: 27 development 
partners are active and together provide around 10 per cent of the national health budget. 
In 2008 the assistance was provided by means of around 75 projects, mostly under half a 
million US dollars in size and almost all funded by individual development partners. 
This fragmented profile poses a strong management challenge to the Ministry of Health, 
which has resorted to creating National Targeted Programmes in relation to particular 
diseases or thematic areas that de facto behave as PIUs and bypass the country’s 
decentralised governance systems. Due to access to additional incentives that the 
development projects bring, most of the ministry’s capacity is concentrated in the 
National Targeted Programmes, which has weakened its policy-making, monitoring, 
regulation and coordination capabilities (Cox et al. 2011). 
The reduced capacity of the ministry has led to problems in coordinating capacity-building 
support. Most efforts have gone into strengthening PIUs (i.e. the capability to manage the 
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external support) and have contributed to multiple and inconsistent budgeting and 
planning initiatives at the provincial level. In 2007 the ministry launched a number of 
initiatives: it formalised the Health Partnership Group, introduced a Joint Annual Health 
Review with a thematic focus, and – similar to what was done earlier in Mozambique – 
formulated an aid-effectiveness agenda specifically for the health sector. This statement of 
intent describes a desired path towards what can be described as a SWAp without the 
complicated funding mechanisms (Cox et al. 2011). 
A study that was commissioned to assess efforts towards harmonisation and alignment of 
TA observed that earlier studies in 2003 and 2006 had identified all relevant issues, which 
nonetheless remain unresolved (Van Konkelenberg / Duc Chung / Van Quang 2010). It 
found that most efforts go towards strengthen the capacity of PIUs, and not the ministry, 
which goes against the spirit of the Hanoi Core Statement. The study further signalled that 
both the ministry and the development partners acknowledge that the problem lies on both 
sides, and observes five principal deficiencies (see Box 7). 
Box 7: TA deficiencies in the Vietnamese health sector 
• “excessive reliance on TA for activity design and conduct (lack of MOH ownership);  
• long delays in implementation (complex and/or duplicated systems on both sides and lack of 
counterpart funds);  
• poor quality implementation (poor TA and TA support quality);  
• lack of consistency in direction (alignment issues);  
• and uncoordinated duplications (harmonization issues).” 
Source: Van Konkelenberg / Duc Chung / Van Quang (2010) 
These problems illustrate that purely because Vietnam is a middle-income country, this 
does not mean that it has effective leadership over – and draws optimal benefits from – 
external CDS. The transition by development partners to other forms of development 
cooperation (e.g. additional emphasis on concessional loans) may, however, create the 
impulse to make the structural changes that, in previous years, proved not to be possible. 
5.5 Relating the country evidence on CD to the international agenda 
Although the analysis of overall policies and one specific sector is an insufficient basis to 
draw conclusions “across the board”,36 the analysis of the four countries points towards 
disincentives on both the side of the developing countries and their external development 
partners to improving the effectiveness of external support to capacity development. 
Beyond incentives, in all four countries – but in differing degrees – the organisation and 
human resource development in the civil service also poses limitations to the enforcement 
of policies that otherwise seem relevant for managing CDS.  
The four countries do differ in the degree in which they pursue management approaches in 
the area of CDS, but this does not seem to result in radically different CDS practices on 
                                                            
36 The general trends in external support are comparable, yet the health sector may not be fully 
representative, as it was purposefully chosen as an amply funded sector. Moreover, in most countries 
specialised “global funds” and the United States are the main partners providing support to the health 
sector, yet both tend to perform below average in adhering to the aid- and development-effectiveness 
agenda – e.g. the United States was considered an aid effectiveness “outlier” in Knack (2013). 
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the part of the external partners. In spite of all approaches to strengthen harmonisation and 
alignment in the area, the prevailing practice of providing support to capacity development 
continues to be largely a “bilateral affair” between the development partner and 
developing-country stakeholders, on which information is not always systematically 
shared with other development partners, if at all. This overview, however, does not allow 
for further analysis to explore to what extent this behaviour is consistent among the 
different development partners or whether some of them are more amenable to country 
leadership than others. Macro-level ineffectiveness may co-exist with highly useful CDS 
at the local level.  
6 Conclusions and recommendations 
The first decade of the new millennium marked a turning point for international 
development cooperation, with a series of High-Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness seeking 
to forge solutions to counter ineffective cooperation practices. The meetings in Rome, 
Paris, Accra and Busan added to an evolving aid- and development-effectiveness agenda. 
A central conviction of this agenda is – and remains – that development partnerships only 
succeed when they are led by developing-country stakeholders. Doing so, however, 
requires strong capacity on the side of developing countries, which is why development 
partners have committed to help them strengthen their capacity. 
Based on a structured literature review and a limited number of semi-structured 
interviews, this paper examined to what extent the aspects of the aid- and development-
effectiveness agenda that address CDS have been translated into practice. Starting from 
the realisation that international cooperation will continue to become more knowledge-
intensive, the paper has analysed the evolved understanding of capacity development, the 
means used to support it through international cooperation, and the extent to which 
successful reforms have or can be made. The paper contextualises its findings in an 
appreciation of the current state of the international dialogue on effective cooperation, 
which is marked by a more elusive international dialogue structure informed through 
“coalitions of the willing”, and non-engagement by providers of South-South cooperation. 
As international cooperation is likely to become more, rather than less, knowledge-
intensive over time, capacity development will remain a key objective.  
International development policy emphasises the nature of capacity development as an 
endogenous, relational and long-term change process, thus acknowledging that there is 
only a limited role for external development partners. Shortly after the Paris Declaration 
was adopted, the DAC Chair argued that “[b]uilding capacity is the central and one of the 
most difficult tasks to achieve in development” (OECD 2006, 23). In recent years, efforts 
have been made to further operationalise this broad concept, clarifying that capacity 
consists of both soft- and hardware, and that it is dynamic and relational as opposed to 
static and independent. There is ample evidence of countries that successfully 
strengthened capacity as a basis for sustainable development. 
In spite of the recognition of its importance and central role in development, developing 
countries often experience difficulties in sufficiently benefiting from external inputs to 
their capacity development processes. Structural problems in the developing countries’ 
public service help to explain the lack of effective ownership in many developing 
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countries, but an equally important cause is the dominant approach, in which external 
support is designed, delivered and evaluated. Development interventions that seek to 
provide direct support to capacity development are provided in a multitude of forms under 
the generic label of “technical cooperation”. In many cases, interventions that are reported 
to the OECD as support to capacity development in fact pursue other legitimate goals, 
such as facilitating the implementation of larger development interventions, although 
assessing this is difficult due to absent or incomplete information. 
The Paris Declaration considers the strengthening of country systems both as a condition 
for effective development cooperation and as a legitimate development result by itself. 
When it comes to CDS, interventions differ in the extent to which (1) they support 
capacity development of country systems, and (2) the extent to which their planning, 
implementation and evaluation make use of country systems. Although there are important 
differences between development partners, practice generally falls far short of the 
commitments made in Paris, Accra and Busan. Many development partners retain 
considerable discretion in assessing country systems and remain reluctant users. Available 
research evidence shows that CDS remains largely supply-driven and top-down and that 
fundamental changes in the planning and design phase are needed to strengthen 
effectiveness.  
To complement the analysis of general policy discussions and practices, an exploration 
was made of policies and practices in managing CDS in Mozambique, Rwanda, Nepal and 
Vietnam. Overall development cooperation management-approaches were found to range 
from strong centralised control efforts (Rwanda) to accommodating policies seeking to 
maximise access to ODA (Mozambique). Some have adopted policies that include overall 
objectives for CDS and set out effectiveness principles (Nepal), whereas others have also 
prioritised specific areas for support (Rwanda, Vietnam). In contrast to this, Mozambique 
has not set out any overall policy principles for CDS and lacks a formal strategy. In 
contrast to these different approaches, the research evidence indicates that development 
partners’ CDS practices are hard to manage in all four countries. It remains a challenge to 
improve transparency of TC and to channel these investments through country systems 
(Rwanda, Nepal), while in Vietnam the management approach used reorients core 
ministry capacity from policy-making towards aid management. The evidence further 
shows that none of the four countries experience equal difficulty in taking control of CDS 
offered by their South-South cooperation partners.  
Although international development partners achieve lower levels of performance in the 
four countries in conforming to aid and development effectiveness compared to other 
areas of support, the overall picture provides interesting contrasts with the specific 
situation in the health sector. The health ministry in Mozambique has taken early steps to 
promote harmonisation, including through a TC pooling arrangement. In recent years the 
situation has worsened due to many development partners preferring bilateral and heavily 
earmarked support arrangements. Nepal and Vietnam, two different countries, face similar 
challenges as support bypasses and negatively affects health-system capacity. In Rwanda, 
60 per cent of the health sector budget is funded through development cooperation, which 
has led to impressive results but also to an overconcentration on some diseases and system 
inconsistencies. Similar to Nepal, much TC does not go through government systems but 
through alternative “channels”. 
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This paper’s findings provide three main conclusions. First of all, available research 
confirms that aid- and development-effectiveness achievements in the area of capacity 
development have been slow and disappointing, owing to reform-resistance of key 
stakeholders involved. Second, considerable potential remains to strengthen the 
effectiveness of CDS by further adapting approaches to design, deliver and evaluate 
interventions in reference to key aid- and development-effectiveness principles. Third, a 
lack of disaggregation of statistics and low levels of investment in evaluation inhibits 
learning and accountability, and ultimately the improvement of capacity development 
results.  
Based on the analysis presented here, four windows of opportunity are identified as means 
to improve the effectiveness of external support:  
• First and foremost, development partners should decentralise the programming of 
CDS to their embassies and country representations. This would facilitate effective 
ownership of CDS by developing countries as it becomes easier for them to take a 
leading role in the design and procurement / recruitment of support. In situations 
where this does not result in effective ownership, it is unlikely that support will lead 
to capacity development.  
• Second, active efforts should be made to demystify the support by identifying 
concrete objectives, improving evaluations and making these publicly available. 
Information on what is concretely done and with what purposes should be presented 
in an accessible format, and should be seen as the logical implementation of the 
transparency of this area of development cooperation, where financial transfers are 
often not a primary element.  
• Third, implementation of the first two recommendations would allow for further 
disaggregating the OECD/DAC reporting on technical cooperation and allow for 
separating genuine CDS from projects with other relevant purposes. This should go 
hand in hand with efforts to improving the transparency and specification of 
interventions. Improving statistics on technical cooperation is essential to support the 
clear need to learn further about the extent to which development partners invest in 
genuine CDS and what results these investments lead to.  
• Fourth and last, the desk research conducted on developing-country management of 
support confirms that further empirical research in this area can further inform the 
concretisation and implementation of these recommendations and play a role in 
improving the effectiveness of support. This would allow for an assessment of the 
extent to which development partners facilitate tailor-made and context-sensitive 
capacity development, as well as for a comparison of the effectiveness of different 
instruments used. This could also help in gaining a further understanding of the 
interrelations between human resource development and the management of the 
public service and the extent of reliance on external CDS, as well as the approaches to 
CDS used and the complementarities between international, regional and “local” 
expertise and knowledge.  
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Annex 
Types of aid as reported to the OECD 
Type of aid  Sub-type 2010 2011 
A: Budget support A01: General budget support 2,384 1,822 
 A02: Sector budget support 3,390 2,392 
B: Core contributions and 
pooled programmes and 
funds 
B01: Core support to NGOs, other 
private bodies, PPPs and 
research institutes 
3,418 3,260 
 B02: Core contributions to 
multilateral institutions 
Not available Not available 
 B03: Contributions to specific-purpose 
programmes and funds managed 
by international organisations 
(multilateral, INGO) 
13,766 10,024 
 B04: Basket funds/pooled funding 1,479 2,039 
C: Project-type 
interventions 
C01: Project-type interventions 54,569 60,947 
D: Experts and other 
technical assistance 
D01 Donor country personnel 2,491 2,797 
 D02: Other technical assistance 3,957 3,605 
E: Scholarships and student 
costs in donor countries 
E01: Scholarships / training in donor 
country 
1,365 1,211 
 E02: Imputed student costs 2,210 2,321 
F: Debt relief F01: Debt relief 4,546 6,704 
G: Administrative costs not 
included elsewhere 
G01: Administrative costs not 
included elsewhere 
5,992 6,173 
H: Other in-donor 
expenditures 
H01: Development awareness 0.387 0.340 
 H02: Refugees in donor countries 3,570 4,543 
Not applicable -0.001 -0.822 
All types, total 103,532 108,103 
Notes: 
• Source: own compilation based on OECD Creditor Reporting System: data for all DAC countries,  
in current prices (billions of US dollars), disbursements 
• Activities of the types of aid in the highlighted cells are reported as Freestanding Technical Cooperation 
For definitions of the types of aid used, please refer to OECD (2009) 
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